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Department of Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles v. Megan-Neave4/25/2003
The Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles ("department") appeals the trial court's order granting Dawna Megan-Neave's motion for summary judgment, thus revoking the seizure of Neave's motorcycle pursuant to the Florida Contraband and Forfeiture Act ("Forfeiture Act"). We reverse.
Neave was the passenger and Raymond E. Potter was the driver of a motorcycle owned by Neave that was stopped for traveling in excess of the speed limit. Because Potter had blood-shot eyes and smelled as if he had been drinking alcohol, the officer conducted a field sobriety test, which indicated that Potter was under the influence of alcohol. Potter was arrested for DUI, and it was discovered that Potter's license was revoked based on a DUI conviction. The department seized the motorcycle pursuant to section 322.34, Florida Statutes, which provides for the forfeiture of a vehicle driven by a person under the influence of alcohol whose license has been suspended for a prior DUI conviction. See § 932.701(2)(a)9., Fla. Stat. (2001).
Neave filed a motion for summary judgment. For the purposes of the hearing, Neave conceded that she had known that Potter was driving her motorcycle under the influence of alcohol, but claimed to have been unaware that his license was suspended. Neave argued that under section 322.34(9)(a), the motorcycle could not be forfeited unless she knew not only that Potter was too impaired to drive, but also that Potter had a suspended license. Neave contended that her ignorance of the status of Potter's driver's license made her an innocent owner under section 932.703(6)(A), Florida Statutes, which provides that property may not be forfeited unless the seizing agency establishes that the owner knew or should have known after reasonable inquiry that the property was being used in criminal activity.
The trial court agreed with Neave that the motorcycle was not subject to forfeiture because the department did not make a showing that Neave had reason to know that Potter's license had been suspended for a previous DUI. On appeal, the department argues that the Forfeiture Act imposes liability on an owner who knew or should have known that the property would be used for criminal purposes. The department reasons that since Neave knew that the driver was under the influence, and thus that her property was being used in the course of criminal activity, she is not an innocent owner.
The question in this case is not whether Neave's motorcycle was subject to forfeiture; it clearly was under the Forfeiture Act and section 322.34(9)(a) because it was driven by a "person" who was driving under the influence and whose driver's license was suspended for a prior DUI. The question is whether Neave was an "innocent owner." An innocent owner is one who did not have reason to know that the owner's property would be "employed in criminal activity." Under section 932.703(6)(A), the department was required to show beyond a preponderance of the evidence that Neave knew or had reason to know that her motorcycle was being used in criminal activity. Since Neave admitted as much, the department made the required showing.
What the court actually ruled was that the department had to prove that Neave knew that particular criminal activity would subject the motorcycle to seizure, but that is not a requirement under the Forfeiture Act. In In re Forfeiture of a 1981 Oldsmobile, 593 So. 2d 1087 (Fla. 1st DCA 1992), the owner's husband was arrested for possession of drugs, and the car he was driving was seized pursuant to the Forfeiture Act. Id. at 1088. The owner claimed to have been out of town, that she was unaware of her husband's use of the vehicle, and that she had no idea that
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