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Johnson v. Maryland4/2/1993 on the roads of this State is also not a right, but a privilege. The Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA)
has exclusive jurisdiction over the issuance of licenses and "what MVA giveth, MVA may taketh away; but only for specific statutorily prescribed reasons and only in accordance with statutorily prescribed procedures and limitations." In re David K., 48 Md. App. 714, 723, 429 S.2d 313 (1981). "Revocation of privileges voluntarily granted is 'characteristically free of the punitive criminal element.'" Emory v. Texas State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 748 F.2d 1023, 1026 (5th Cir. 1984), quoting Helvering, 303 U.S. at 399 and n.2 (medical license revocation proceedings are highly penal in sense that valuable rights are at stake, but despite sanction's severity, its character is remedial); see Showery v. Samaniego, 814 F.2d 200, 203 (5th Cir. 1987) (even though alleged basis for appellate bond revocation is commission of a subsequent offense, the proceedings are not designed to obtain a conviction for violation of that offense but are designed to assess the propriety of allowing a defendant who has already been convicted and sentenced on a separate charge to remain free on bond; such proceedings are not "essentially criminal"). Appellant was deprived of a valuable right when the administrative judge issued him a restricted license. He was not, however, subject to criminal punishment for the same offense under the Double Jeopardy Clause. See Emory, 748 F.2d at 1026.
We also believe that the Supreme Court's holding in Halper has no effect on our decision. On its face, Halper clearly applies to instances where the government attempts to extract from a person who has committed a punishable act, preceded or followed by a criminal prosecution, a monetary penalty "related to the goal of making the Government whole." Halper, 109 S. Ct. at 1903. The case at bar does not fit the strictures of such a "rare case." Id. at 1902. The State did not seek, nor was appellant subject to, an excessive fine at the administrative hearing. Appellant was merely deprived of some driving privileges for a two-month period. We believe, then, that Halper leaves undisturbed cases, such as the one at bar, that have found the revocation of voluntarily granted
privileges to be civil in nature, not punitive, and merely remedial.
Appellant laments that "other than incarceration, no punishment handed down by any court is greater than denying to a person who relies on his automobile the use of that automobile by taking away his privilege to drive." While appellant may be subjected to the incidental imposition of some disability as a result of the administrative proceeding, we do not believe that the MVA sanction handed down in this case rose to the level of punishment or had the punitive elements envisioned by the Supreme Court in Halper.
Order DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AFFIRMED; CASE REMANDED FOR A TRIAL ON THE MERITS.
COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
Disposition
ORDER DENYING MOTION TO DISMISS AFFIRMED; CASE REMANDED FOR A TRIAL ON THE MERITS. COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANT.
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