North Carolina v. McKoy9/7/1988
tively defined standards, violated the Eighth Amendment" because it was discriminatory, "wantonly" imposed and "afforded 'no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in which it imposed from the many cases in which it not.'" Lockett, 438 U.S. at 599, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 986 (quoting Furman, 408 U.S. at 257, 310, 313, 33 L. Ed. 2d at 359, 390, 392). In attempting to follow Furman, some states adopted mandatory death penalties for certain crimes, thus eliminating any jury discretion in sentencing. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 599-600, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 986-87.
In the wake of Furman, the Court examined death penalty statutes in five states. A plurality found the mandatory death sentence statutes in Louisiana and North Carolina unconstitutional. Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 49 L. Ed. 2d 974 (1976); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944 (1976). A plurality also found, however, that the Georgia, Texas, and Florida statutes, which were not mandatory and which provided certain safeguards to the defendant in the capital-sentencing process, were not constitutionally invalid. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859 (1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913 (1976). In Gregg, the plurality wrote that "the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner can be met by a carefully drafted statute that ensures that the sentencing authority is given adequate information and guidance." Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 887. From these opinions, the plurality opinion in Lockett concluded that "sentencing procedures should not create 'a substantial
risk that the death penalty [will] be inflicted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.'" Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 987 (quoting Gregg, 428 U.S. at 188, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 883).
In the view of the three Justices, . . . Furman did not require that all sentencing discretion be eliminated, but only that it be "directed and limited," 428 U.S., at 189, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909, so that the death penalty would be imposed in a more consistent and rational manner and so that there would be a "meaningful basis for distinguishing the . . . cases in which it is imposed from . . . the many cases in which it is not." Id., at 188, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859, 96 S. Ct. 2909.
Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 987-88.
The plurality opinion in Lockett acknowledged that mandatory death sentencing was unconstitutional. " he sentencing process must permit consideration of the 'character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.'" Lockett, 438 U.S. at 601, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 988 (quoting Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. at 304, 49 L. Ed. 2d at 961 (plurality opinion)). The opinion stated that "the sentencer . . . not be precluded from considering as a mitigating factor, any aspect of a defendant's character or record and any of the circumstances of the offense that the defendant proffers as a basis for a sentence less than death." Lockett, 438 U.S. at 604, 57 L. Ed. 2d at 990 (emphasis in original).
Ohio's death-penalty statute, which the Court examined in Lockett, mandated the imposition of the death penalty where a jury had found at least one aggravating circumstance unless, considering "the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history,
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