North Carolina v. McKoy9/7/1988
he judgment of the Court of Appeals, insofar as it sustained the death penalty, and remanded for resentencing. Id. at , 100 L. Ed. 2d at 400.
In Franklin v. Lynaugh, U.S. , 101 L. Ed. 2d 155 (1988), a case decided after Mills, the Supreme Court again examined Texas' capital-sentencing process. That process provided for the submission of two "Special Issues" to the jury. If the jury answered "yes" to both questions, the defendant would be sentenced to death. Id. at , 101 L. Ed. 2d at 162. The defendant in Franklin requested instructions that the jurors should take mitigating evidence into account in answering the Special Issues, so that they could answer "no" to either one or both of the Special Issues, even if they otherwise would have answered the Special Issues "yes." Id. at , 101 L. Ed. 2d at 162-63. The trial court instead instructed the jurors that they should reach their verdict based on all the evidence. Id. at , 101 L. Ed. 2d at 163. The defendant argued that the Special Issues precluded the jury from considering certain mitigating evidence. Even though the Texas capital-sentencing process does not mention mitigating evidence, id. at , 101 L. Ed. 2d at 177 (Stevens, J., dissenting), the plurality opinion held that the Texas procedure was not unconstitutional.
The plurality opinion stated that there are "two lines of cases . . . [which] are somewhat in 'tension' with each other" -- the cases holding that the jury must not be precluded from considering all relevant evidence, and the cases holding that states must channel the exercise of jury discretion, id. at , 101 L. Ed. 2d at
171, and that the procedure in Texas "accommodates both of these concerns." Id. at , 101 L. Ed. 2d at 171 (emphasis in original). The plurality opinion concluded that " Lockett does not hold that the State has no role in structuring or giving shape to the jury's consideration of . . . mitigating factors." Id. at , 101 L. Ed. 2d at 169.
his Court has never held that jury discretion must be unlimited or unguided; we have never suggested that jury consideration of mitigating evidence must be undirected or unfocused; we have never concluded that States cannot channel jury discretion in capital sentencing in an effort to achieve a more rational and equitable administration of the death penalty.
Id. at , 101 L. Ed. 2d at 170. States "must channel the [capital] sentencer's discretion by 'clear and objective standards' that provide 'specific and detailed guidance' and that 'make rationally reviewable the process for imposing a sentence of death.'" Id. at , 101 L. Ed. 2d at 170 (quoting Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420, 428, 64 L. Ed. 2d 398, 406 (1980) (plurality opinion) (footnotes omitted)).
Thus, the Supreme Court has given individual scrutiny to several states' capital-sentencing procedures to determine whether they were non-mandatory and allowed for individualized sentencing, yet adequately channeled the discretion of the sentencer. The Court has upheld some procedures -- see Franklin v. Lynaugh, U.S. , 101 L. Ed. 2d 155; Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 49 L. Ed. 2d 859; Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 49 L. Ed. 2d 929; Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242, 49 L. Ed. 2d 913 -- while declaring others invalid -- see Mills v. Maryland, 486 U.S. , 100 L. Ed. 2d 384; Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 71 L. Ed. 2d 1; Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 57 L. Ed. 2d 973; Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S. 325, 49 L. Ed. 2d 974; Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 49 L. Ed. 2d 944. Therefore, in examining the aspect of our capital-sentencing process in question here, we mus
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