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WEAVER v. STATE12/22/1986
The appellant, Anthony Eudean Weaver, was convicted of driving while intoxicated and sentenced to six months imprisonment, a $250 fine and suspension of his driver's license for 120 days. The court of appeals certified this case to us, as one of first impression.
Appellant questions two decisions of the trial judge on appeal. First, the trial judge refused to allow two defense witnesses to testify because they were not disclosed to the state before trial. Second, the results of a blood alcohol test were admitted over the appellant's objection. We find no error and affirm the conviction.
The state made a timely request for disclosure of the names of all the defense witnesses. A.R.Cr.P. Rule 18.3. The appellant did not disclose the names of two witnesses called in his defense, and the trial court refused to allow these two witnesses to testify. The appellant argues that the trial court incorrectly construed A.R.Cr.P. Rule 18.3., which provides:
Subject to constitutional limitations, the prosecuting attorney shall, upon request, be informed as soon as practicable before trial of the nature of any defense which defense counsel intends to use at trial and the names and addresses of persons whom defense counsel intends to call as witnesses in support thereof
Appellant argues that since his defense was a general denial, the phrase "any defense" in the rule does not apply. The basis of his argument is that since the Criminal Code and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure were written by the same commission, divided into two committees and adopted substantially together, they must be construed as a whole. He argues that the word "defense" is defined in the code and that definition does not include a general denial. He then concludes that we should similarly interpret the phrase "any defense" as used in the Rules of Criminal Procedure. We decline to so interpret our rule.
The commentary to Article V of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
The rules which follow trace the contours of a comprehensive discovery scheme characterized by broad reciprocal pretrial disclosure aimed at expediting the criminal justice process.
Broad pretrial disclosure would seem to be not only desirable but also necessary. By encouraging guilty pleas, reducing delays during trial, and in general lending more finality to the disposition of criminal cases, disclosure alleviates docket congestion and permits a more economical use of resources.
We are still of the opinion that discovery in criminal cases, within constitutional limitations, must be a two-way street. This interpretation promotes fairness by allowing both sides the opportunity for full pretrial preparation, preventing surprise at trial, and avoiding unnecessary delays during the trial. The trial court construed our rule correctly considering its purpose.
This interpretation does not mean that genuine rebuttal witnesses must be disclosed, for neither the state nor the defense would necessarily know in advance of the need for their testimony. See Parker v. State, 268 Ark. 441, 597 S.W.2d 586 (1980).
The appellant next argues that the trial court was wrong in admitting the results of a blood alcohol test because it was not shown that the test was performed pursuant to Ark. Stat. Ann. 75-1045 (Supp. 1985). The test in this case was ordered by an emergency room physician for his own information. The trial judge admitted the test results. The appellant objected to the introduction of the test results because it was not shown that the test was conducted according to Ark. Stat. Ann. 75-1046(b)
(Repl. 1979), which requires the test to be con
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