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State v. Stilley6/4/2003
WHOLE COURT
Stiles Dean Stilley, who was charged with driving under the influence , moved to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic stop. Finding that the police officer who stopped Stilley lacked articulable suspicion for the stop, the trial court granted the motion. The State appeals and, for reasons that follow, we reverse.
In reviewing a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress, we defer to the trial court's factual findings unless such are clearly erroneous. In this case, the facts are largely undisputed, and we review the application of the law to the facts de novo.
The record shows that on March 22, 2001, at approximately 6:30 p.m., Officer D. L. Williams received a dispatch that a male -- later identified as Stilley - was "slumped over the wheel at a red light." The unknown person who called in the message to law enforcement also relayed that the male was in a pickup truck, gave the location of the truck, and provided the license plate number. Williams, who was " airly close" to the location, drove to the intersection, looking for the pickup truck. When Williams found the truck, Stilley was properly driving down the road. Although Williams did not witness Stilley commit any traffic violations, he activated his blue lights and siren, signaling Stilley to stop. Rather than stopping, Stilley continued driving for approximately two to three miles before another officer assisted Williams in forcing Stilley to stop.
Stilley was arrested and charged with driving under the influence . He then moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that the police lacked reasonable, articulable suspicion for the stop. The trial court agreed and granted the motion.
" n officer may conduct a brief investigative stop of a vehicle only when such a stop is justified by specific, articulable facts sufficient to give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct." The "stop must be justified by some objective manifestation that the person stopped is, or is about to be, engaged in criminal activity."
The U. S. Supreme Court recognized the difficulty in defining the elusive concept of what cause is sufficient to authorize police to stop a person, and concluded that the essence of the elusive concept was to take the totality of the circumstances into account and determine whether the detaining officer has a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of criminal activity. This demand for specificity in the information upon which police action is predicated is the central teaching of the Supreme Court's Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.
Under the totality of the circumstances, we agree with the trial court that Williams lacked a sufficient basis for stopping Stilley. The record demonstrates that Williams heard that a driver was slumped over the steering wheel at a red light. By Williams' own testimony, he responded quickly and discovered Stilley driving with no apparent difficulty. Thus, Williams' concern that Stilley was incapacitated should have been dispelled at that time. Although Williams certainly could have followed Stilley to ascertain that he was driving safely, he was not authorized to institute an immediate investigatory stop under the circumstances of this case. To the extent that this Court's ruling in State v. Thomason suggests otherwise, it is hereby overruled.
The State further argues that Williams was authorized to pull Stilley over to ensure that he was "`okay.'" Although a police officer may act out of a desire to be solicitous, if he suspects wrongdoing, he must comply with the Fourth Amendment, which requires that he have some objective basis for suspecting crim
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