STAUDINGER v. BARRETT6/28/1988
dict with respect to contributory negligence. The defendants argue, and the plaintiff concedes, that, under the general verdict rule, if either of the plaintiff's grounds for appeal is found by this court to be unmeritorious, then the general verdict must stand.
The general verdict rule provides that where the jury renders a verdict for one party and no party requests interrogatories, we presume that the jury found every issue in favor of the prevailing party. Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 202 Conn. 190, 202, 520 A.2d 208 (1987). This rule applies whenever a verdict for one party could reasonably have been rendered on one or more distinct causes of action or distinct defenses. Id.
The defendants' denial of negligence and their allegations of contributory negligence constitute two discrete defenses, either of which could have supported the jury's general verdict. Stone v. Bastarache, 188 Conn. 201, 205, 449 A.2d 142 (1982). The verdict might have been predicated on the defendants' freedom from negligence or on the plaintiff's comparatively greater negligence. Kalleher v. Orr, 183 Conn. 125, 127, 438 A.2d 843 (1981). In light of the plaintiff's failure to request interrogatories to ascertain the basis of the jury's verdict, we must uphold it, under the general verdict rule, if either defense is legally supportable. Id. Further, if the trial court's instructions to the jury are shown to be proper and adequate as to any of the defenses raised, the general verdict must stand, regardless of error, if any, in the charge as to any other defense. Stone v. Bastarache, supra; Meglio v. Comeau, 137 Conn. 551, 553-54, 79 A.2d 187 (1951).
The plaintiff had requested that the trial court charge the jury that violation of the Bethel police department's high speed chase policy was negligence per se. The court denied the request and instructed the jury that it could consider such violation, if any, evidence of negligence. The plaintiff contends that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury as requested was prejudicial error.
The doctrine of negligence per se serves to Superimpose a legislatively prescribed standard of care on the general standard of care. Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Conn. 173, 178, 439 A.2d 954 (1981). To establish negligence in a negligence per se case, the jury need only decide whether the defendant violated the relevant statute or regulation. Id.; Citerella v. United Illuminating Co., 158 Conn. 600, 607-608, 266 A.2d 382 (1969); Essam v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 140 Conn. 319, 324, 99 A.2d 138 (1953).
General Statutes 14-283a (b), enacted in 1978, mandates that the police department of each municipality adopt a high speed pursuit policy establishing allowable driving, support and other police tactics. The plaintiff argues that the Bethel policy was adopted to comply with the legislature's command and thus has the force of a statute, the violation of which requires
a jury instruction on the doctrine of negligence per se. The defendants counter that the policy, which was written by former police chief Richard Carlo in 1977, was merely reviewed by the defendant Basile in 1978. They maintain that the policy was not itself a statute, nor was it enacted as a municipal ordinance or promulgated as a regulation and, therefore, does not have the force of law. Accordingly, they argue, its violation does not warrant a negligence per se instruction, and the trial court was correct in instructing the jury that violation of the policy was evidence of negligence.
There was evidence produced to show that the chase policy had been violated. Barrett admitted that his
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