State v. Mckimmie6/7/1988
Rep. 1277, 1289. If events are capable of different interpretations, the trier of fact shall determine which is the most reasonable. State v. Matson (Mont. 1987), [227 Mont. 36,] 736 P.2d 971, 973, 44 St.Rep. 874, 875, citing State v. Atlas (Mont. 1986), [224 Mont. 92,] 728 P.2d 421, 423, 43 St.Rep. 2042, 2044.
In the instant case, the State was required to show that McKimmie purposely or knowingly caused the death of Valarie. "Knowingly" is defined in Section 45-2-101(33), MCA:
"A person acts knowingly with respect to conduct or to a circumstance described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of his conduct or that the circumstance exists. A person acts knowingly with respect to the result of conduct described by a statute defining an offense when he is aware that it is highly probable that such result will be caused by his conduct. [Emphasis added.]
This "knowing" element was manifest in McKimmie's actions. McKimmie admitted that he had broken into Eugene Ameline's apartment earlier in the evening. McKimmie removed the weapon used to kill Valarie, which was a 7.65 Mauser rifle, and two sizes of ammunition from the apartment. He left everything else in place.
McKimmie testified that he then tried to commit suicide with the rifle around 10:30 p.m. on June 5. As he was positioning himself on the couch, he claimed that the rifle slipped off the coffee table and discharged into the refrigerator. But the District Court stated: "You said that you attempted to commit suicide, but it's the Court's belief that you fired that shot that hit the refrigerator, about a foot from the floor, just to see if it worked, see if you had the right ammunition in the gun."
McKimmie testified that he reloaded the rifle around 12:30 a.m. According to McKimmie, when Valarie came home at about 1:30 a.m., McKimmie talked to her about his attempted suicide. While he was holding the rifle across his lap, Valarie sat on an adjacent couch. McKimmie stated that he fell back, and the gun discharged. McKimmie testified: "I looked at her and thought, my God, she's dead." A firearms expert testified that the rifle was operating normally and that Valarie was shot from a distance of less than four feet.
We find that McKimmie's actions prior to, during and after the shooting demonstrate an awareness of his conduct and its probable results. However, McKimmie next asserts that he is an alcoholic and was not aware of what he was doing because he drank alcohol from noon on June 5, 1987, until his arrest on June 6, 1987, for DUI. We note Section 45-2-203, MCA (1985), which states:
"A person who is in an intoxicated or drugged condition is criminally responsible for his conduct unless such condition is involuntarily produced and deprives him of his capacity to appreciate the criminality of his conduct . . . [Emphasis added.]"
By his own admission on the witness stand, McKimmie had voluntarily consumed alcohol since noon. Where sufficient credible evidence supports the findings, the question of the relationship of voluntary intoxication to specific intent will not be reconsidered on appeal. State v. Hardy (1980), 185 Mont. 130, 135, 604 P.2d 792, 795-796. In light of the supporting evidence, we will not make an independent determination of the effect of voluntary intoxication on the defendant's state of mind. State v. Sage (Mont. 1986), [221 Mont. 192,] 717 P.2d 1096, 1101, 43 St.Rep. 738, 744.
Finally, McKimmie admits that his flight after the shooting might infer knowledge or purpose, but he asserts that mere flight does not establish the requisite mental state. We note that, standing alone, such flight does not
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