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North Carolina v. Williams6/2/1988
id or did not tell his probation officer was collateral to the issues in the case; therefore, it was improper to impeach him on this point by offering the testimony of Robert Terry and Monique Mills. Robert Terry's and Monique Mills' testimony was not offered to prove that defendant had, in fact, made the alleged statements to David Small. Rather, the testimony was offered solely to contradict Small's testimony that he had not told Robert Terry that defendant made these statements. While the substance of those statements and whether defendant made them would be material, whether Robert Small had told anyone about defendant's statements is clearly collateral.
We recognize that on 1 July 1984 our current Rules of Evidence, N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, went into effect and governed this trial. While these Rules control almost all evidence questions that arise, "there are some evidentiary questions that are not within the coverage of these rules. In these instances, North Carolina precedents will continue to control unless changed by our courts." N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Commentary, Rule 102 (1986). Arguably, Rule 403 is designed to render the evidence considered here inadmissible. See Dolan, Rule 403: The Prejudice Rule in Evidence, 49 So. Cal. L. Rev. 220 (1976). Indeed the Court in Moore gave as one reason for excluding the evidence that "the prejudicial effect of such evidence outweighs its legitimate use . . . ." 275 N.C. at 213, 166 S.E.2d at 662. Since, however, our precedents speak so clearly to the evidence question presented and the Rules speak, if at all, only obliquely, we have no hesitancy in following our precedents to resolve the issue. In either event, the result is the same.
Under N.C.G.S. § 15A-1443(a) (1983), reversible error exists "where there is a reasonable possibility that, had the error in question not been committed, a different result would have been
reached at trial." Here, the statements attributed to defendant constituted an admission that he had, indeed, raped the victim. In light of the sharp conflict in the evidence, with the question of defendant's guilt hinging solely upon whether the jury believed his testimony or the prosecutrix's testimony, we conclude that had this evidence not been erroneously admitted there is a reasonable possibility of a different result at trial. See State v. Cutshall, 278 N.C. 334, 180 S.E.2d 745. Defendant, therefore, must be given a
New trial.
Disposition
New trial.
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