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Frost v. City of Walla Walla9/11/1986
e suit. The trial court denied his claim for damages, based upon RCW 69.50.506(c), which states: "No liability is imposed by this chapter upon any authorized state, county or municipal officer, engaged in the lawful performance of his duties." Frost contends, however, that this immunity should only apply to the police officers, and would not immunize the City of Walla Walla from liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior.
Frost can find support for this argument in the Court of Appeals decision of Spencer v. King Cy., 39 Wash. App. 201, 692 P.2d 874 (1984). In Spencer, the Court of Appeals reversed a summary judgment verdict, in favor of King County, arising after one of the County's mental health officials allegedly improperly arrested and confined a suspected mental patient. The mental health official who allegedly behaved tortiously when ordering such confinement was insulated from liability pursuant to RCW 71.05.120.
This statute states that peace officers and public officials who arrest and confine individuals for mental health reasons are not liable either civilly or criminally for their actions. The Court of Appeals read the statute very narrowly, and believed it only applied to officials and did not grant immunity to the County. The appellate court therefore decided that, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the county employing the mental health official could be liable.
It is true that following the rationale of Spencer, the City of Walla Walla could be liable even if RCW 69.50.506(c) insulated its officers. However, the Spencer decision contradicted an earlier Supreme Court decision in Creelman v. Svenning, 67 Wash. 2d 882, 410 P.2d 606 (1966). In Creelman, a prosecutor allegedly filed inappropriate charges against an individual, and the individual brought an action against both the prosecutor and the County for malicious prosecution. While it was beyond dispute that the prosecutor was immune from prosecution, this court also held that the policy of insuring prosecutorial immunity to promote "free, independent, and untrammeled action" required that the County also be immune.
The public policy which requires immunity for the prosecuting attorney, also requires immunity for both the state and the county for acts of [prosecutors] in the performance of the duties which rest upon them; otherwise, the objectives sought by immunity to the individual officers would be seriously impaired or destroyed.
br Creelman, at 885.
We believe that the Creelman rationale is correct, and should apply in this case. It is readily apparent that the purpose behind RCW 69.50.506(c) was to promote efficient and unhampered police action, free from the hindrance created if liability could be imposed on police for their good faith, objectively reasonable actions. To give the officers protection against liability, while allowing suits against the jurisdiction employing them, would defeat this purpose. We therefore believe that RCW 69.50.506(c) protects
both the officers and the City from civil liability. To the extent that the appellate court's decision in Spencer is inconsistent with this holding, it is hereby overruled.
Frost, however, argues that even if RCW 69.50.506(c) would insulate both the police officers and the City from liability, it should not apply. Frost seizes upon the fact that the search was improper and that RCW 69.50.506(c) only ap
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