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State v. Hantman5/16/1991
[169 Ariz Page 414] This special action presents yet another question regarding the application of the Supreme Court's decision in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109
L.Ed.2d 548 (1990). In this case, the issue is whether the double jeopardy clause precludes the use of evidence, in a criminal trial for driving under the influence of alcohol (DUI), of conduct that was the basis of a civil traffic citation upon which a default judgment was entered and a fine was paid. This is a matter of statewide importance involving legal as opposed to factual issues. Therefore, we accept jurisdiction. University of Arizona Health Sciences Center v. Superior Court, 136 Ariz. 579, 667 P.2d 1294 (1983). For the reasons stated below, we grant relief.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Real party in interest David Root was arrested and cited for DUI under A.R.S. § 28-692(A)(1) and (2), criminal offenses, and for unsafe movement on a roadway under A.R.S. § 28-754, a civil violation. The appearance on the civil citation and the arraignment on the DUI charges were set for September 19, 1990. Root failed to appear, and a default judgment was entered on the civil citation. Petitioner State of Arizona filed a motion to dismiss that charge on November 7, but before the court signed the order granting the motion, Root paid a fine pursuant to Rule 11, Civ. Traf. Violation R.P., 17B A.R.S. On November 19, the day after the court granted the motion to dismiss the civil charge, Root filed a motion to dismiss the remaining DUI charges based on double jeopardy. The magistrate denied the motion but ordered that the state was precluded from presenting in the DUI trial any evidence of Root's conduct that was the basis of the unsafe movement citation. The state sought special action relief from the respondent superior court, which was denied. This special action followed.
DOUBLE JEOPARDY
The double jeopardy clause "protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal[,] . . . a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction[,] . . . nd . . . multiple punishments for the same offense." North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717, 89 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 23 L.Ed.2d 656, 664-65 (1969). In Grady v. Corbin, supra, the Supreme Court held that to determine whether a subsequent prosecution is barred, a court must first apply the test articulated in Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932). In addition, the Court ruled that the "Double Jeopardy Clause bars any subsequent prosecution in which the government, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution, will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted." 495 U.S. at 521, 110 S.Ct. at 2093, 109 L.Ed.2d at 564.
The defendant in Grady had been in an automobile accident that resulted in the death of the driver of the other car. He was cited for DUI, a criminal charge, and failing to keep his car to the right of the median, a civil offense. The defendant pled guilty to the traffic citations and was sentenced to a fine and license revocation. He was subsequently charged with homicide and assault, which he moved to dismiss on double jeopardy grounds. The Court held that the subsequent prosecution was barred because the bill of particulars showed that the state was relying on the conduct of driving while intoxicated and failing to keep right of the median to establish the essential elements of the homicide and assault offenses. If
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