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Glasser v. Maryland5/29/1991
After a non-jury trial in the Circuit Court for Baltimore County, John Charles Glasser, appellant, was convicted of manslaughter by automobile. For this offense, he was sentenced to five years imprisonment. Appellant now challenges his conviction by asking:
Was a prosecution for manslaughter by automobile barred by the prohibition against double jeopardy?
Before addressing this question, we outline the underlying facts. On June 30, 1989, an automobile driven by appellant collided with another vehicle on the Baltimore Beltway. The driver of the other vehicle died as a result of injuries sustained during the collision. Appellant, meanwhile, was cited for driving the wrong way on a one-way street and driving while intoxicated. In lieu of standing trial, appellant paid a $35 fine on the charge of driving the wrong way on a one-way street. The State nol prossed the driving while intoxicated charge. A criminal information was subsequently issued charging appellant with manslaughter by automobile (count 1), homicide by motor vehicle while intoxicated (count 2), and six other related offenses. Appellant moved to dismiss counts 1 and 2 on the basis of double jeopardy, but the court denied appellant's motion.
The parties then proceeded on count 1 by way of an agreed statement of facts. The facts recited by the prosecutor revealed that, on the Baltimore Beltway in the early morning hours of June 30, 1989, appellant's vehicle swerved into a lane of oncoming traffic. While "traveling in the wrong direction on the inner loop of the beltway," the vehicle driven by appellant collided with a vehicle operated by Everett Jones. Mr. Jones died as a result of injuries sustained in the collision. Blood samples drawn from the appellant during the hours following the collision indicated that his blood alcohol level was between .253 and .226.
Investigation of the accident scene revealed approximately forty two feet of skid marks from Mr. Jones' vehicle. There was, however, no indication of braking at any time from appellant's vehicle. After the conclusion of the statement of facts, appellant renewed his motion to dismiss. The court denied the motion and convicted appellant of manslaughter by automobile.
On appeal, Glasser again contends that double jeopardy barred prosecution of the charge of manslaughter by automobile. In support of this argument, appellant relies upon Grady v. Corbin, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990). Grady involved a fatal automobile accident on a New York highway. The collision occurred when the automobile driven by Corbin crossed the double yellow line and struck two oncoming vehicles. The driver of one of the oncoming vehicles was killed as a result. Following the collision, Corbin was served with traffic citations for driving while intoxicated and failing to keep right of the median. He pleaded guilty to the traffic offenses, was fined, and temporarily lost his driving privileges.
Two months after the sentencing on the traffic offenses, Corbin was indicted for, among other things, reckless manslaughter, criminally negligent homicide, and reckless assault. The prosecution filed a bill of particulars indicating that to prove the charges it would rely on three acts: appellant's driving while intoxicated, his failure to keep right of the median, and his driving at an excessive rate of speed for the weather and road conditions at the time of the accident. Corbin moved to dismiss, arguing that the indictment subjected him to double jeopardy in contravention of the Fifth Amendment.
The Supreme Court ruled that the indictment was violative of double jeopardy principles. Grady, U.S. at , 110 S.Ct. at 2094, 109 L.Ed
Page 1 2 Maryland DUI Attorneys
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