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In re Montrail M.5/15/1991
o additional Fourth Amendment rights were implicated by the canine scan of Matio C.'s station wagon. The dog's reaction properly served as probable cause to search the vehicle.
III.
Bruton Problem
Over the appellants' objections, the juvenile court permitted the deputy sheriff who took statements from the juveniles involved in the incident to testify regarding those statements. The appellants now contend that the admission of the testimony violated the Bruton rule. In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968), the Supreme Court held that where two defendants are tried together, a confession by one defendant that implicates the other cannot be admitted into evidence unless the confessing defendant takes the stand and is available to be cross-examined by the other defendant. This court has
held that the Bruton rule is applicable to juvenile delinquency proceedings. See In re Appeal No. 977, 22 Md. App. 511, 516, 323 A.2d 663 (1974).
A review of the record establishes that the State's attorney attempted to prevent any Bruton problem by asking the deputy to reveal only those portions of each juvenile's statement that implicated that particular juvenile. This attempt was unsuccessful. The deputy testified to the effect that each youngster told him that he and the others had gone to Philadelphia on the previous evening and had purchased drugs. It is thus clear that the Bruton rule was violated. Cf. Cruz v. New York, 481 U.S. 186, 193-94, 107 S.Ct. 1714, 1719-20, 95 L.Ed.2d 162 (1987) (holding that the Bruton rule applies even where the defendant's own confession interlocks with a codefendant's confession).
We find, however, that the violation does not rise to the level of reversible error. While the statements complained of contained somewhat varying degrees of detail, they were substantially identical. None was more inculpatory than another. We are confident that, under the circumstances, there was "no reasonable possibility that the evidence complained of . . . contributed to the rendition" of the delinquency findings. Dorsey v. State, 276 Md. 638, 659, 350 A.2d 665 (1976). See generally Cruz, 481 U.S. at 194, 107 S.Ct. at 1719-20. See, e.g., Earhart v. State, 48 Md. App. 695, 707-12, 429 A.2d 557 (1981).
JUDGMENT AS TO MONTRAIL M. FOR DRIVING WITHOUT A LICENSE REVERSED AND REMANDED; JUDGMENT AS TO MONTRAIL M. FOR POSSESSION OF COCAINE AND POSSESSION OF COCAINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE AFFIRMED; DISPOSITION AS TO MONTRAIL M. VACATED.
JUDGMENTS AS TO HAROLD S., JR. AND MATIO C. AFFIRMED.
ONE-HALF OF COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS AND ONE-HALF BY KENT COUNTY.
Disposition
JUDGMENT AS TO MONTRAIL M. FOR DRIVING WITHOUT A LICENSE REVERSED AND REMANDED; JUDGMENT AS TO MONTRAIL M. FOR POSSESSION OF COCAINE AND POSSESSION OF COCAINE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE AFFIRMED; DISPOSITION AS TO MONTRAIL M. VACATED. JUDGMENTS AS TO HAROLD S., JR. AND MATIO C. AFFIRMED. ONE-HALF OF COSTS TO BE PAID BY APPELLANTS AND ONE-HALF BY KENT COUNTY.
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