State v. Lentz5/1/1991
dant's receiving his Miranda warnings.
In State v. Williams (1983), 6 Ohio St.3d 281, 290, 6 OBR 345, 352, 452 N.E.2d 1323, 1333, the Supreme Court of Ohio adopted the holding from Innis, supra, 446 U.S. at 301, 100 S.Ct. at 1689, 64 L.Ed.2d at 308, that "interrogation in the context of Miranda rights, refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response from the subject.'"
The record in this case reveals several details that are somewhat disturbing. First, we are concerned by the testimony of the arresting officer that, subsequent to making an arrest, he generally exercises his independent judgment in choosing to give the warnings required, not only by Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, but also by State v. Buchholz (1984), 11 Ohio St.3d 24, 11 OBR 56, 462 N.E.2d 1222. For example, in response to a question as to whether he Mirandized the defendant in the instant case, the officer specifically testified, "I'm not sure if I read those to him or not. * * * Sometimes I do, sometimes I don't. Usually if it is apparent they know the system I don't feel it is necessary."
The officer further explained his subjective criteria for administering the Miranda warnings as follows:
"* * * Usually if there is somebody and they have a clean driving record and they seem to not have much dealing with the law, the way things happen in a court, if they seem uneducated where they don't - if they haven't watched TV or anything, I read them Miranda rights, but if they appear halfway educated, and you know, they have had dealings with the law before, sometimes I don't feel it is necessary. * * * A lot of times I don't read them."
In addition, the officer testified that once an arrest is made and the suspect is in custody in the police cruiser, the officer usually engages the arrestee iscasual conversation in transit to the police station. The officer further testified that he initiates these conversations with the full knowledge that the suspect may very well "blurt out" incriminating statements. Thus, without administering the prescribed warnings, it is apparent that this officer routinely creates an atmosphere of camaraderie that would lead a reasonable person to believe that any statements made during casual conversation with the officer are meaningless and will not be used against him in the courtroom.
In the case before us, the incriminating statements made by defendant were the result of the rapport that the officer, without benefit of the Miranda warnings, intentionally established with the defendant. In accordance with the dictates of Innis and State v. Williams, supra, we find that the statements were the result of police interrogation. The second assignment of error is overruled.
For the foregoing reasons, that portion of the judgment of the trial court suppressing the statements made by defendant in violation of his Fifth Amendment rights is affirmed. However, that portion of the judgment suppressing the breathalyzer results is reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part and cause remanded.
THOMAS F. BRYANT, P.J., HADLEY and SHAW, JJ., concur.
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