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Nash v. Commonwealth5/21/1991
KOONTZ, J.
In a bench trial held on October 31, 1989, David Wayne Nash, appellant, was convicted of driving under the influence of alcohol pursuant to Code § 18.2-266 and sentenced to thirty days in jail, fined $300, and had his operator's license suspended for three years pursuant to Code § 18.2-270 for the second violation of the same offense within a five year period. On appeal, Nash contends (1) the trial court erred by admitting into evidence his statements made before he was given Miranda warnings, and (2) the evidence is insufficient to sustain his conviction. We disagree and affirm Nash's conviction.
On April 29, 1989, Virginia State Trooper Ken Keesee arrived at the scene of a motor vehicle accident in Amherst County, where he found a 1978 Plymouth sedan completely off the road and wedged underneath a telephone guide wire. He did not find anyone near the vehicle. However, Trooper Beck, whom Trooper Keesee had radioed for assistance, found Nash walking down another road about a quarter of a mile from the accident and returned Nash to the accident scene. Upon Nash's return to the scene, Trooper Keesee began questioning Nash. As requested, Nash produced his driver's license and vehicle registration, and then told Keesee that he was alone driving the car when the accident occurred around seven o'clock in the evening. Thereafter, Keesee continued his accident investigation with Nash in the
State Police patrol car, where Nash explained how the accident happened. As they discussed the accident, Keesee smelled alcohol on Nash and noticed Nash's eyes were somewhat bloodshot. Keesee then asked Nash if he had been drinking any alcohol. Nash told Keesee he consumed five or six beers, the last one about an hour before the accident. Keesee then subjected Nash to several field sobriety tests. After completing coordination tests and administering a field alcosensor test, Keesee placed Nash under arrest for driving under the influence and informed him of the Virginia implied consent law and of his Miranda rights. Nash informed Keesee he wished to take a breath test, which Keesee personally administered to Nash in Lynchburg about twenty to thirty minutes later. The results of that breath test indicated Nash's blood alcohol content was .15 percent by weight by volume.
While Nash acknowledges that, under Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984), individuals are not necessarily entitled to be informed of their Miranda rights during routine traffic stops, he also argues police are required to advise suspects of their Miranda rights when such a detention evolves into a custodial interrogation. Nash contends he was not subject to a routine traffic stop when he made his statements, but instead was in custody and subjected to a custodial interrogation. We disagree.
Custodial interrogation means "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (footnote omitted); accord Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 428. However, persons temporarily detained pursuant to routine traffic stops are not "in custody" for Miranda purposes. In such cases, "the officer may ask the detainee a moderate number of questions to determine his identity and to try to obtain information confirming or dispelling the officer's suspicions" that the detainee has committed a crime. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 439. "If a motorist who has been detained pursuant to a traffic stop thereafter is subjected to treatment that renders him
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