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STATE v. GEISLER5/11/1990
ust not be permitted to swallow the rule: in the absence of a showing of true necessity - that is, an imminent and substantial threat to life, health or property - the constitutionally guaranteed right to privacy must prevail." (Emphasis added.) People v. Smith, 7 Cal.3d 282, 286, 101 Cal.Rptr. 393, 496 P.2d 1261 (1972); see also Good v. Dauphin County Social Services, supra, 1094. If we were to sanction the application of the emergency doctrine in this case, we would create a precedent that could be misinterpreted by law enforcement authorities as a more expansive ticket of entry into a person's private home than the emergency doctrine, in fact, permits.
We do not adopt a "bright line" test for cases such as these, but here we conclude that this case does not provide sufficient factual circumstances meriting the application of the emergency doctrine. We acknowledge that "salutary and empirical doctrine of an emergency
or exigency making reasonable a warrantless entry . . ."; Root v. Gauper, 438 F.2d 361, 365 (8th Cir 1971); but the facts of this case do not warrant the application of that doctrine. Cf. id. We must be continually reminded that, while a limited intrusion into the home is constitutionally acceptable, under some circumstances, "physical entry of the home" is the principal concern of the fourth amendment. United States v. United States District Court, supra, 313. Under the limited circumstances of this case, we conclude that the trial court incorrectly found that exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry of the police into the defendant's home.
C
FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE
The state also argues, however, that even if the trial court incorrectly found that the entry of the defendant's home was justified under the emergency doctrine, such error was harmless because the evidence derived from the defendant was not obtained by the exploitation of an illegal seizure. The trial court concluded that even if the officer's entrance into the defendant's home was not justified by emergency circumstances, the blood alcohol test results and the statements subsequently made by the defendant while his arrest was being videotaped were nonetheless admissible because they were not the "fruit of an illegal arrest." We disagree.
Whether the evidence derived from an unlawful warrantless entry and arrest is attenuated from the initial unlawfulness must be answered on the facts of each case. Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603, 95 S.Ct. 2254, 45 L.Ed.2d 416 (1975). The determination of whether evidence has been obtained by exploitation of an illegal arrest generally includes, in addition to
consideration of whether Miranda warnings have been given, the consideration of " he temporal proximity of the arrest and the confession, the presence of intervening circumstances . . . and, particularly, the purpose and flagrancy of the officer's misconduct." Id., 603-604. The burden of showing the admissibility rests upon the state. Id., 604. Applying these criteria to the present case, we find that the derivative evidence, namely, the defendant's statements, the intoximeter results, the videotape, and the photograph, must be suppressed.
We begin by noting that the state concedes in its brief that the time period between the arrest and the defendant's station house statements and consent to take the intoximeter test was minimal. The state argues, however, that certain intervening circumstances establish that the defendant voluntarily gave these statements, and his consent thus assured that they were not obtained by exploitation of the illegal arrest.
This particular issue is very similar to that add
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