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Schrimsher v. Maryland12/20/1991
Petitioner, Frank Lonnie Schrimsher (Schrimsher), attempts to bootstrap his payment before trial of the preset fines for certain traffic violations into a double jeopardy bar to a prosecution for driving while intoxicated. The attempt will be unsuccessful. We explain.
On July 8, 1990, Schrimsher, while driving a motor vehicle in Worcester County, was stopped by a trooper of the Maryland State Police. On Maryland Uniform Complaint and Citation forms Schrimsher was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI), in violation of Md.Code (1977, 1987 Repl.Vol., 1991 Cum.Supp.), § 21-902 of the Transportation Article (TA), with exceeding the speed limit in violation of TA § 21-801.1, and with failure to drive to the right of center in violation of TA § 21-301(a). The three charges were set for trial on February 5, 1991. On the day of trial, before his case was called, Schrimsher paid the present fines of $45 for speeding and of $35 for failure to drive to the right of center. Schrimsher then moved to dismiss the DWI charge on double jeopardy grounds. The District Court denied the motion, but apparently permitted Schrimsher to note an immediate de novo appeal to the Circuit Court for Worcester County from that denial. The Circuit Court for Worcester County denied the motion to dismiss. Schrimsher petitioned this Court for the writ of certiorari which we issued.
I
We have today held that there is no immediate appeal from the District Court to a circuit court from the
denial of a motion to dismiss, on double jeopardy grounds, a criminal charge pending in the District Court. See Huff v. State, 325 Md. 55, 599 A.2d 428 (1991). Accordingly, the Circuit Court for Worcester County had no appellate jurisdiction in this case.
II
As we did in Huff, we express our views on the double jeopardy contention raised here, because of the recurring nature of the issue.
For at least two reasons, Schrimsher has not been subjected to a second prosecution following conviction for the same offense. First, there is but one prosecution of these multiple offenses. See Huff. Secondly, within this single prosecution, none of the multiple offenses is the same offense as any other. Driving while intoxicated does not require proof that the accused drove to the left of the center of the road or that the accused exceeded the speed limit. Neither driving to the left of the center of the road nor speeding requires proof that the accused was driving under the influence of alcohol. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 97 S.Ct. 2221, 53 L.Ed.2d 187 (1977); Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 52 S.Ct. 180, 76 L.Ed. 306 (1932).
Schrimsher submits that the foregoing analysis has been changed by Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 110 S.Ct. 2084, 109 L.Ed.2d 548 (1990), a prosecution by New York. In Grady the defendant, Corbin, initially had been charged with DWI and failing to keep to the right of center. He pleaded guilty to both and was sentenced. Two months later Corbin was indicted, inter alia, for reckless manslaughter and third degree reckless assault. By a bill of particulars, which was binding on the prosecution until amended, New York acknowledged that it would rely on the same conduct involved in the prior convictions. In Grady the Court held that double jeopardy barred the successive
prosecution because New York would "prove the entirety of the conduct for which Corbin was convicted -- driving while intoxicated and failing to keep to the right of the median -- to establish essential elements of the homicide and assault offenses." 495 U.S. at 523, 110
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