Motor Vehicle Administration v. Bruce Clayton Shrader. Motor Vehicle Administration10/31/1991
t to extend indefinitely the driving privileges of a driver awaiting a suspension hearing; indeed, MVA, and MVA alone, determines both when the hearing will be initially scheduled and whether there can ever be a sanction.
MVA has successfully argued that it would be ludicrous to go through a subterfuge, i.e., set a hearing that it knows
will have to be postponed. That argument is based upon a faulty premise. It assumes that MVA's determination that the hearing could not be held within the prescribed period is objectively accurate, when, in fact, we just don't know that that is so. But even if it were a subterfuge and that it is ludicrous, it is not for MVA or, for that matter, this Court to countermand the Legislature, which must be presumed to have understood what it was doing, and to have meant to do it. The Legislature, in mandatory terms, required that an administrative hearing be set within 30 days of a hearing request and, further, that a postponement, in its commonly understood sense, coupled with an extension of the temporary license, if necessary, must be obtained in the event the hearing cannot be held. Its mandate is clear. There is no need or justification for ignoring it.
Although I start from the same premise, I emphasize the need for compliance with the mandatory scheduling provision, rather than that provision that permits extension of the temporary license. The latter is, to my mind, important only when it is objectively demonstrable that MVA cannot provide a hearing within the time prescribed. Focusing on the scheduling requirement and sanctioning its violation by dismissing the suspension order has the virtue of requiring MVA to comply with the legislatively mandated scheduling provision, rather than encouraging its disregard, of emphasizing promptness, rather than delay, and of furthering the public interest. The majority's argument that, so long as a hearing is held within 45 days, the maximum life of the temporary license, or such period thereafter during which a driver's privilege to drive is extended by MVA gives MVA unreviewable discretion to allow a driver to continue to drive until MVA decides that it is time to hold a hearing. This is in derogation of the Legislature's concern with
limiting the period during which that driver is permitted to drive.
Nor am I persuaded by the majority's argument that, to justify dismissal, a driver must show prejudice. Again, the primary beneficiary of the statutory scheme is the public, not the drivers. Looking "to the purpose of the rule or statute in either of the circumstances of its violation to determine the appropriate sanction for violation of its provisions," Gaetano v. Calvert County, 310 Md. 121, 126, 527 A.2d 46, 48 (1987), makes clear that the critical consideration is not prejudice, but whether the sanction furthers the legislation's purpose. Viewed from the correct perspective, i.e., "the consequences of the non-compliance in light of the totality of the circumstances," Gaetano, 310 Md. at 127, 527 A.2d at 48, I believe the answer is obvious. Unless the sanction for failure to set an administrative hearing within the mandatory time period prescribed by § 16-205.1(f)(5)(i) is dismissal, MVA will have no incentive to comply with the legislative mandate; it will continue to ignore the scheduling provision and, when necessary, to extend the life of the temporary license. The dismissal sanction ensures not only expeditious scheduling of a hearing, but also that MVA will apply the statute so that hearings will be held in the shortest possible time.
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 Maryland DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|