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Motor Vehicle Administration v. Bruce Clayton Shrader. Motor Vehicle Administration10/31/1991
y time) for, scheduling of, and conduct of an administrative hearing at which a driver may challenge the order of suspension issued to him. See § 16-205.1(b)(3)(v)1. Nor do I quarrel with the majority's statement of the statute's purpose; I concede that it was enacted primarily for protection of the public, rather than the driver.
The majority and I also agree upon the appropriate sanction for violation of the statutory scheme: dismissal. The difference between us is the timing of, and trigger for, that sanction. The majority, as does MVA, acknowledges that if a driver is deprived of the privilege to drive for even one day prior to a timely requested hearing, he or she will have been prejudiced, without due process, and, thus, entitled to have the order of suspension dismissed. But they both also assert that it is § 16-205.1(f)(5)(iii) that provides the sanction for violation of the scheduling provision.
There is no doubt but that, so long as the request is postmarked ten days or less after issuance of the order of suspension, MVA is required to set a hearing within thirty days of receipt. § 16-205.1(f)(5)(i). Compare § 16-205.1(f)(b)(ii). Relying on the life of the temporary license issued pursuant to § 16-205.1(b)(3) and legislative history, specifically letters from Assistant Attorney General Katherine M. Rowe and Colonel Joseph Cooke of the Baltimore City Police Department concerning, respectively, the validity of the summary suspension provisions and Nevada's experience with similar legislation, the majority concludes that "the 45 day period was contemplated as part of an overall administrative plan," at 465, and that " learly, . . . the General Assembly intended that the hearing be held within 45 days from the driver's suspension." At 466.
MVA concedes, and the majority agrees, that if the hearing is initially scheduled more than 45 days after detention and the temporary license is not extended, then dismissal is the proper sanction. Because, however, the purpose of the legislation is primarily to benefit the public, rather than the driver and, in this case, the violations caused only a one or two day delay in scheduling and holding the hearings, which, nevertheless, were held within 45 days, they say that the mere violation of the mandatory scheduling provision does not require the dismissal sanction.
Construing the statutory scheme as contemplating that hearings would be scheduled within 45 days of the issuance of the order of suspension, as opposed to within 30 days of receipt of a request for hearing, does not promote expeditious hearings and, moreover, is productive of potentially illogical results. MVA need not comply with the 30 day scheduling requirement in the case of drivers whose requests for hearings are received less than 15 days from detention; it could schedule those hearing after 30 days, but still within 45 days. On the other hand, timely requests received on the 15th day would have to be honored within 30 days, or be dismissed; failure to schedule within 30 days would mean that the temporary license would have expired. In the former case, a violation would result in no sanction; in the latter, a violation of the same length would require dismissal. It is not at all clear that the Legislature intended that MVA set a hearing at any time within the 45 day period rather than within the 30 day mandatory scheduling period, whatever the timing of its receipt of the request for hearing.
Issuance of a 45 day temporary license ensures, whether the request for a hearing is made on the first day, or on the tenth day, allowing for necessary postal delivery, that MVA will have 30 days in which to schedule the hearing. The majority does not d
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