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STATE v. BENTO12/26/1991
Defendant Scott D. Bento challenges an order of the Superior Court (Hancock County, Beaulieu, J.) denying his motion to suppress a blood-alcohol breath test. After the denial of his motion, Bento entered conditional guilty pleas (Smith, J.) pursuant to M.R.Crim.P. 11(a)(2), to aggravated OUI, 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B (1978 & Supp. 1989), and reckless conduct with the use of a dangerous weapon, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 211 (1983). Because the court, when determining whether probable cause existed to justify the breath test, made inconsistent and irreconcilable findings, we vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
In August 1989, Bento was involved in a two-vehicle accident in Bar Harbor. Heather Billman, a passenger in Bento's car, was killed in the accident. After the accident, Chief Daniel C. Herrick of the Bar Harbor Police Department met both drivers in the waiting area of Mt. Desert Hospital's emergency room, read them the Implied Consent Warning pursuant to 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312 (1978 & Supp. 1989), and administered a breath test to Bento and the other driver.
Bento filed a motion to suppress the results of the breath test on the ground that this evidence was obtained in violation of the fourth amendment. Following an evidentiary hearing, the court ruled that under section 1312(11)(D), in order for the
I.
The court interpreted section 1312(11)(D) as requiring that, in order for the blood-alcohol test results to be admitted into evidence, probable cause must have existed before the test was taken. We reject the court's interpretation. We conclude that the statute does not require that probable cause exist prior to a driver's submitting to the test.
Statutory application must be consistent with the legislative intent as divined from the language of the statute. See State v. Edward C., 531 A.2d 672 (Me. 1987); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co., 513 A.2d 283 (Me. 1986). In this case, cognizant that the Legislature has established a firm general policy favoring the admission of blood-alcohol tests, see State v. Baker, 502 A.2d 489, 494 (Me. 1985); State v. Adams, 457 A.2d 416, 419 (Me. 1983), we hold that the Legislature intended that test results obtained pursuant to section 1312(11)(D) be admissible if probable cause could be established at trial by any information discovered up to the time admission was sought.
First, we observe that the Legislature did not intend to treat an operator involved in a motor vehicle fatality in the same fashion as an operator involved in a routine OUI stop. Compare 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312(1)-(3) & (12) (probable cause of OUI must exist to conduct a blood-alcohol test; admission of the test results dependent on informing driver of consequences of failing to comply) with 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312(8) & (11) (motor vehicle accident involving death, by itself, sufficient to conduct a blood-alcohol test; moreover, admission of the test does not depend upon giving the warnings of the consequences of refusing the test). Second, section 1312(11)(D) provides that:
he result of a test taken pursuant to this paragraph is not
admissible at trial unless the court is satisfied that probable
cause exists, independent of such test result, to believe that
the operator was under the influence of intoxicating liquor or
drugs or had excessive
29 M.R.S.A. § 1312(11)(D) (emphasis added). This provision describes the court's responsibility when admission of the test results is sought at trial. The court must ascertain that probable cause then exists. The statute does not require, by its terms, that the court determine whether probable cause existed at some
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