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Leong v. San Francisco Parking Inc.9/30/1991
hile permitting it against the nonsupplier. "Obviously, the supplier . . . is better able to foresee the risk of harm to others and thus engages in the more culpable conduct. [Citation.] We do not believe the Legislature intended such a whimsical anomaly." (Strang v. Cabrol, supra, 37 Cal. 3d at p. 725.) We therefore conclude that section 25602, "reasonably construed" (Cory v. Shierloh, supra, 29 Cal. 3d at p. 437), bars suit against those who simply
permit the consumption of alcoholic beverages on their premises as well as against those who supply alcohol.
Supporting our conclusion is Andre v. Ingram (1985) 164 Cal. App. 3d 206, 209 [210 Cal. Rptr. 150], in which plaintiff claimed that defendant, a social host "who did not own the vehicle, did not drive the vehicle, and did not furnish alcoholic beverages to the driver . . . ," had a duty to prevent plaintiff from leaving in a car driven by defendant's intoxicated son. Reasoning that the difference between a supplier and nonsupplier "cannot be one which would impose liability . . ." (id., at p. 210), the court held that " he law which bars liability for a host who furnishes alcoholic beverages applies with even greater force where . . . the host (hostess) did not furnish the alcoholic beverage. . . ." (Id., at p. 208, italics added.) The court also rejected plaintiff's argument that the existence of a special relationship between host and guest imposed on defendant a legal duty to control her adult son's conduct (id., at p. 210), finding that " he Legislature has established that consumption, not furnishing, alcoholic beverages is the proximate cause of resulting injuries. It would be unreasonable to conclude that a person, who did not prevent another person from driving while intoxicated, would not be liable if he furnished the alcohol which caused the intoxication, but would be liable if he did not furnish it." (Id., at p. 211.)
Also supporting our conclusion is DeBolt v. Kragen Auto Supply, Inc. (1986) 182 Cal. App. 3d 269 [227 Cal. Rptr. 258], in which the court affirmed the sustaining of demurrers without leave to amend on the basis of section 25602. Plaintiffs in DeBolt, who were the heirs of two people killed by a drunk driver, argued that the statute did not apply because "their cause of action . . . not based on [defendant] serving [the driver] alcoholic beverages; rather it based on [defendant's] conduct ordering and causing [the driver] to leave and to drive in an intoxicated state . . . ." (Id., at p. 272.) The court disagreed, finding that section 25602 "specifically abrogate our Supreme Court's application of common law negligence principles to alcohol consumption-related injuries." (Id., at p. 274.) Following Andre v. Ingram, supra, 164 Cal. App. 3d 206, the court refused to adopt an interpretation of section 25602 that would enable plaintiffs to avoid the effect of the statute by couching their complaints "in language apart from furnishing or selling liquor." (DeBolt, supra, at p. 275.) Here, we decline the Leongs' invitation to adopt just such an interpretation.
The judgments are affirmed.
Disposition
The judgments are affirmed.
Judges Footnotes
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