 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Mitchell v. Montgomery County10/2/1991
ed reading of the Ristaino holding. The Court of Appeals held that it was error to give both a mere
accident and presumption of negligence instruction, even though both were independently proper on the evidence, because in combination they tended to confuse and mislead the jury. This Court specifically held in Ristaino that a mere accident instruction, if supported by the evidence, is proper. Ristaino, 76 Md. App. at 671 n. 7, 547 A.2d 1115. This aspect of our holding was not disturbed by the Court of Appeals' reversal.
There was more than sufficient evidence to support this instruction in the instant case. To cite but one example, the bus driver testified that he was driving properly, had his headlights on and was watching the road, but that Mitchell suddenly appeared in front of the bus. These facts, if believed, give rise to an inference of a mere accident.
-- Pedestrian's Use of a Crosswalk --
Mitchell also contends that the trial judge's instruction on a pedestrian's failure to use a crosswalk was error, because it was not supported by the facts of the case, and was thus confusing and misleading to the jury. We do not agree. On the contrary, Mitchell himself testified that he had already crossed the road once while hitchhiking, and that he was standing on the paved portion of the road when he was struck by the bus. These facts suggest at least an inference that Mitchell may have been crossing the road again when he was struck.
-- Pedestrian's Soliciting a Ride --
Mitchell contends that the trial court's instruction on a pedestrian's solicitation of a ride was not supported by the facts of this case. This assertion belies Mitchell's own
testimony that he was hitchhiking prior to being struck by the bus.
-- Sudden or Real Emergency --
Mitchell also argues that there were no facts in this case to support the trial judge's "sudden and real emergency" instruction. Again, we do not agree. The bus driver in his testimony repeatedly stated his belief that Mitchell appeared in front of the bus suddenly and without warning. While there was conflicting evidence on this point, there was sufficient evidence of a sudden and real emergency to warrant the trial judge's instructions on this point.
-- Duties of Motorist and Pedestrian --
Mitchell proffered an instruction in the form of a quotation from Cohen v. Rubin, 55 Md. App. 83, 93, 460 A.2d 1046 (1983). While the proffered instruction was specifically upheld in Cohen, there is no obligation on the part of the trial judge to give a particular instruction if the instructions actually given fairly cover the issues raised in the proffered instruction. Rule 2-520(c); Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 84 Md. App. 10, 43, 578 A.2d 228 (1990), cert. granted, 322 Md. 737, 589 A.2d 968 (1991). The trial judge's other instructions fairly covered the points raised by Mitchell in the proffered instruction.
On this same issue, Mitchell proffered an instruction based on language in Whitt v. Dynan, 20 Md. App. 148, 161,
315 A.2d 122 (1974). Whitt, however, does not address the respective rights and duties of motorists and pedestrians, as asserted by Mitchell, but rather addresses whether violation of the statute requiring pedestrians to walk facing traffic is negligence as a matter of law. As such, it is inapposite to this case, where no such ruling was made or even considered.
-- Effect of Witness' Testimony --
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Maryland DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|