Bowie v. Maryland9/11/1991
ias involves credibility findings whose basis cannot be easily discerned from an appellate
record." Id. To these factual findings, an appellate court must defer. Id.
As reported in Witt, 469 U.S. at 415-16, 105 S.Ct. at 848, 83 L.Ed.2d at 846, the decision to excuse a venireperson for cause was made after the following colloquy was had at the bench:
[Q. PROSECUTOR]: Now, let me ask you a question, ma'am. Do you have any religious beliefs or personal beliefs against the death penalty?
[A. COLBY]: I am afraid personally but not --
Speak up, please.
: I am afraid of being a little personal, but definitely not religious.
: Now, would that interfere with you sitting as a juror in this case?
: I am afraid it would.
: You are afraid it would?
: Yes, sir.
: Would it interfere with judging the guilt or innocence of the Defendant in this case?
: I think so.
: You think it would.
: I think it would.
: Your Honor, I would move for cause at this point.
THE COURT: All right. Step down.
Applying the standard it had enunciated, the Court stated: "whatever ambiguity respondent may find in this record, we think that the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly was by its assessment of Colby's demeanor, was entitled to resolve it in favor of the State." 469 U.S. at 434, 105 S.Ct. at 857, 83 L.Ed.2d at 858. The trial court's finding of bias was, it concluded, fairly supported by the record. 469 U.S. at 435, 105 S.Ct. at 858, 83 L.Ed.2d at 858.
We applied Witt in Grandison v. State, 305 Md. 685, 506 A.2d 580, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 873, 107 S.Ct. 38, 93 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986), and Hunt. Review of those cases will, therefore, assist us in resolving the issue sub judice.
In Grandison, the defendant complained about the court's striking 23 of the 26 prospective jurors who expressed some hesitation in applying the death penalty, arguing "that it is clear that the court improperly struck these jurors because their beliefs were not such as to prevent them from rendering an impartial verdict." 305 Md. at 724, 506 A.2d at 599. Relying on the Witt standard, we rejected the defendant's challenge. In so doing, we acknowledged that deference must be given to the trial judge's decision to exclude a prospective juror for cause and, after quoting from the pertinent portion of Witt, see Grandison, 305 Md. at 725, 506 A.2d at 600, we explained:
In our view, Judge Simpkins was painstakingly thorough in the questioning of prospective jurors, particularly those who obviously had problems with the death penalty in general. Furthermore, the trial judge afforded Grandison, his standby attorney, and the State's attorney ample opportunity to question the prospective jurors. In short, we are satisfied that the entire procedure was carefully executed in an effort to obtain a fair and impartial jury both as to the defendant and to the State.
Id. at 726, 506 A.2d at 600.
At issue in Hunt was the propriety of the trial court's rulings excluding, and refusing to exclude, prospective jurors for cause. Although the case involved the "reverse Witherspoon " situation -- rather than expressing a predisposition against the death penalty, the prospective jurors at issue expressed a predisposition in favor of the death penalty -- we again applied the Witt standard. Hunt, 321 Md. at 414, 415,
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