North Carolina v. Robinson10/3/1991
76 U.S. 79, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69 (1986); N.C. Const. art. I, § 26. Although the defendant in this case is black, as was the defendant in Batson, we note that the United States Supreme Court has recently held that a white juror also has standing to assert an equal protection claim when a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors "solely by reason of their race." Powers v. Ohio, U.S. , , 113 L. Ed. 2d 411, 424 (1991).
Borrowing from its Title VII jurisprudence, the Supreme Court in Batson set out a two-step process to determine whether a prosecutor has impermissibly used race to discriminate against potential jurors during jury selection. First, a criminal defendant must make out a prima facie case of discrimination by demonstrating that the prosecutor has exercised peremptory challenges to remove potential jurors solely because of their race and that this fact and other relevant circumstances raise an inference of discrimination. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 96, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 87-88, as modified by Powers v. Ohio, U.S. , 113 L. Ed. 2d 411. Once
a prima facie case is established, the burden shifts to the prosecutor to come forward with a nonracial, neutral explanation for the peremptory challenges. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 97, 90 L. Ed. 2d at 88. Consistent with Title VII case law, this Court has permitted a third step, allowing a defendant to introduce evidence that the State's explanations are a pretext. State v. Greene, 324 N.C. 238, 240, 376 S.E.2d 727, 728 (1989); cf. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668, 679 (1973).
In this case, defendant objected each time the State peremptorily challenged a black juror, and on each occasion the trial judge conducted a hearing in chambers during which the State voluntarily stated its reasons for each challenge. The trial court, on each occasion, denied defendant's objection. Prior to the jurors being sworn and impaneled, defendant made a motion to discharge the entire panel. At this point, the trial judge conducted an additional hearing and subsequently entered an order outlining his findings of fact and conclusions of law.
The trial court found that of ninety-nine potential jurors examined, eighty-one were white, eighteen were black. Of the eighty-one white jurors, thirty-six were excused for cause, six as being opposed to capital punishment, and sixteen by peremptory challenges of the defendant. Of the remaining twenty-three potential jurors, ten were peremptorily challenged by the State, eleven were seated as jurors and two were chosen as alternates. Thus, of the twenty-three white potential jurors available to the State, forty-three percent were peremptorily challenged.
The trial court found that of the eighteen potential black jurors, five were excused for cause, one by the consent of both parties and six as being opposed to capital punishment. Of the remaining six potential jurors, five were peremptorily challenged by the State and one was chosen as a juror. Thus, of the six black potential jurors available to the State, eighty-three percent were peremptorily challenged.
The trial court concluded that defendant had failed to make out a prima facie case of discrimination, but that even if the defendant were found to have met his initial burden, the State had articulated neutral explanations for its peremptory challenges. Defendant challenges both conclusions.
We find it unnecessary to address the trial court's conclusion that defendant failed to make a prima facie case of discrimination because in this case the State voluntarily prof
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