Johnetta J. v. Municipal Court for San Francisco Judicial District3/20/1990
prologue: the determination that a particular intrusion is a Fourth Amendment search "only [begins] the inquiry into the standards governing such searches." (New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 337 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 731]; Skinner, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 619 [103 L.Ed.2d at p. 661, 109 S.Ct. at pp. 1413-1414].) "For the Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all searches and seizures, but only those that are unreasonable. [Citations.]" (Id., at p. 619 [103 L.Ed.2d at p. 661, 109 S.Ct. at p. 1414].) Whether a search is reasonable "depends upon all of the circumstances surrounding the search or seizure and the nature of the search and seizure itself. [Citation.]" (United States v. Montoya de Hernandez (1985) 473 U.S. 531, 537 [87 L.Ed.2d 381, 388, 105 S.Ct. 3304].) The reasonableness of a particular type of search "is judged by balancing its intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its promotion of legitimate governmental interests." (Delaware v. Prouse (1979) 440 U.S. 648, 654 [59 L.Ed.2d 660, 667-668, 99 S.Ct. 1391], fn. omitted.)
In most cases the balance is struck in favor of the Fourth Amendment's warrant clause. "Except in certain well-defined circumstances, a search or seizure . . . is not reasonable unless it is accomplished pursuant to a judicial warrant issued upon probable cause. [Citations.]" (Skinner, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 619 [103 L.Ed.2d at p. 661, 109 S.Ct. at p. 1414].) As it recently emphasized in Skinner, however, the high court has recognized exceptions to this rule "when 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.'" (Griffin v. Wisconsin (1987) 483 U.S. 868, 873 [97 L.Ed.2d 709, 717, 107 S.Ct. 3164], quoting New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, 469 U.S. at p. 351 [83 L.Ed.2d at p. 741] [Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment]; Skinner, supra, 489 U.S. at p. 619 [103 L.Ed.2d at p. 661, 109 S.Ct. at p. 1414].) When faced with special needs, the courts have "not hesitated to balance the governmental and privacy interests to assess the practicality of the warrant and probable cause requirements in the particular context. [Citation.]" (Id., at p. 619 [103 L.Ed.2d at p. 661, 109 S.Ct. at p. 1414], italics added.)
The concept of "special need" has developed in an ad hoc fashion, but has been employed to uphold searches in numerous contexts involving special
circumstances making the warrant or probable cause requirements impracticable. In New Jersey v. T. L. O., supra, 469 U.S. 325, the court upheld warrantless searches by school officials of student property without probable cause, citing the special need of schools to maintain security and order and an environment in which learning can take place. (Id., at pp. 340, 341 [83 L.Ed.2d at pp. 733-734].) In O'Connor v. Ortega (1987) 480 U.S. 709 [94 L.Ed.2d 714, 107 S.Ct. 1492], the court held the special needs of government-as-employer justified warrantless work-related searches, without probable cause, of the desks and offices of public employees. In Griffin v. Wisconsin, supra, 483 U.S. 868, the Court approved warrantless searches, without probable cause, of the homes of probationers. In Bell v. Wolfish (1979) 441 U.S. 520 [60 L.Ed.2d 447, 99 S.Ct. 1861], body cavity searches of prison inmates were upheld. And in New York v. Burger (1987) 482 U.S. 691 [96 L.Ed.2d 601, 107 S.Ct. 2636], the court approved searches of the premises of businesses engaged in activities subject to a high level of state regulation.
In Skinner the court reemphasized its adherence to the "special needs" doctrine and held that railroad employees involved in major train accidents, or accidents involving death, injury or substantial propert
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