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Olson v. Walker6/27/1989
that Walker disregarded the fact that his ability to drive safely was impaired, thereby creating a substantial risk of significant harm to others. Walker drove to the bar, and he does not suggest he intended to leave by another method. When he left, he drove recklessly and was speeding in the middle turn lane, instead of driving cautiously in an attempt to minimize the risk to others.
This evidence amply supports a finding of an evil mind. To hold otherwise based on Walker's testimony that he neither knew of nor consciously disregarded the substantial risk he was creating would be tantamount to determining punitive damages exclusively on a defendant's own testimony of his lack of an evil mind, even when his conduct indicates otherwise. The mental states of intent and knowledge cannot
be disproved on a defendant's mere denial of them.
It is sufficient that Walker should have known that his conduct was so egregious that it created a substantial risk of harm to others. See Linthicum, 150 Ariz. at 330, 723 P.2d at 679 ("It is only when the wrongdoer should be consciously aware . . . that his conduct is so outrageous, oppressive or intolerable . . . .") (emphasis added). In White v. Mitchell, 157 Ariz. 523, 759 P.2d 1327 (App.1988), this court upheld a punitive damages award against a truck driver based upon testimony that an experienced driver would have known the brakes were unsafe. We concluded that even though the evidence was circumstantial, the jury could have found that the driver knew the truck was unsafe, giving rise to a substantial risk of serious injury to other drivers and pedestrians. Id. at 529, 759 P.2d at 1333. In this case, a person who knows it is unsafe to drink and drive would have known it was unsafe to drive after drinking ten beers in an hour.
Walker's reliance on case law from other jurisdictions is misplaced. For example, he cites Baker v. Marcus, 201 Va. 905, 114 S.E.2d 617 (Ct.App.1960) in which a Virginia court refused to sustain a punitive damages award against an intoxicated driver. The reason for the court's holding, however, was that the facts did not indicate the accident was the result of the defendant's intoxication, as opposed to simple negligence when she momentarily took her eyes off the road. Id. at 910, 114 S.E.2d at 621. The defendant's degree of intoxication was considered "borderline" and she was only charged with reckless driving. Id. at 907, 114 S.E.2d at 619; see also Miskin v. Carter, 761 P.2d 1378 (Utah 1988). Similarly, in Detling v. Chockley, 70 Ohio St.2d 134, 139, 436 N.E.2d 208, 212 (1982), the court held that punitive damages were not recoverable against a drunk driver where there were no surrounding circumstances demonstrating the malice required to impose punitive damages. In Gesslein v. Britton, 175 Kan. 661, 266 P.2d 263 (1954), the court refused to allow a claim for punitive damages based on the defendant's intoxication alone because the plaintiff had failed to allege any facts showing "gross and wanton negligence." The fact that the defendant drove while intoxicated was insufficient standing alone to award punitive damages. Id. at 664, 266 P.2d at 265.
By contrast, here there was clear and convincing evidence that Walker's intoxication was well beyond borderline and that the accident occurred solely because he was intoxicated. In addition, Walker had taken Valium and was driving recklessly in excess of the speed limit. Intoxication alone, in the absence of other compelling circumstances, may not warrant punitive damages. E.g., Biswell v. Duncan, 742 P.2
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