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Rymer v. Hagler6/27/1989
.) Appellant did not seek review of the WCAB judge's decision within the allotted time. Therefore, not only is further litigation on the issue of coverage precluded under the doctrine of collateral estoppel, but appellant may not invoke the jurisdiction of the WCAB or the courts to review the lawfulness of the hearing officer's decision. Upon the expiration of time for reconsideration, the decision of the WCAB judge was final and conclusive. (See United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1962) 201 Cal. App. 2d 545, 549 [20 Cal. Rptr. 395]; Young v. Industrial Acc. Com. (1944) 63 Cal. App. 2d 286 [146 P.2d 693].)
We conclude that the WCAB judge's finding that compensation was provided at the time of the injury was a final judgment for purposes of collateral estoppel, particularly since appellant did not seek reconsideration
of the coverage ruling and dismissed the workers' compensation proceeding without making any effort to challenge the WCAB judge's decision.
II.
Does Coverage By Estoppel Sufficiently Comply With the Requirement of Section 3700 to "Secure the Payment of Compensation" so as to Preclude a Civil Action Brought Under Section 3706 ?
Section 3700 requires a private employer in California to "secure the payment of compensation" in one of two ways. An employer may either be "insured against liability to pay compensation in one or more insurers duly authorized to write compensation insurance" in California or obtain a certificate of self-insurance pursuant to section 3715. (§ 3700; Muffett v. Royster (1983) 147 Cal. App. 3d 289 [195 Cal. Rptr. 73].) The WCAB judge found coverage despite the absence of both. Appellant contends that an employer must have an actual written insurance policy in effect at the time of an employee 's injuries to invoke the exclusive remedy rule under section 3706 and that coverage based on estoppel is insufficient. Whether coverage by estoppel amounts to "secur the payment of compensation" requires the interpretation of section 3700 and therefore is a legal question which may be reviewed de novo on appeal. (See Muffett v. Royster, supra, 147 Cal. App. 3d at p. 300; Los Angeles County Safety Police Assn. v. County of Los Angeles (1987) 192 Cal. App. 3d 1378, 1384 [237 Cal. Rptr. 920].)
"A fundamental rule of statutory construction is to ascertain the intent of the Legislature, based on an examination of the legislative history and the statutory context of the enactment under scrutiny so as to effectuate the purpose of the law. [Citations.]" (Chong v. Fremont Indemnity Co. (1988) 202 Cal. App. 3d 1097, 1101 [249 Cal. Rptr. 264].) The underlying purpose of the Act is to provide employees a quick, simple, and readily accessible method of claiming and receiving compensation for workrelated injuries. (Santiago v. Employee Benefits Services, supra, 168 Cal. App. 3d 898, 901.) The statute was intended to require adequate insurance coverage against the liability to pay or furnish compensation. (Strickland v. Foster, supra, 165 Cal. App. 3d 114, 118, citing Rideaux v. Torgrimson (1939) 12 Cal. 2d 633, 637 [86 P.2d 826].) The Legislature clearly intended the burden of securing compensation for the employee to be on the employer . (Muffett v. Royster, supra, 147 Cal. App. 3d at p. 301.)
However, even though the employer is required to "secu
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