 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Stumpf v. Commonwealth5/2/1989
her husband and received money from the robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-462. Moreover, a conspiracy is not terminated by commission of the crime until the spoils are divided and the co-conspirators have "gone their separate ways." Berger v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 332, 335, 228 S.E.2d 559, 561 (1976).
Stumpf challenges the admission of testimony given by Bertha Merriman concerning statements made by his wife during telephone conversations that occurred while Mary was at the Hunter Motel , in which Mary fabricated the story that Merriman had disappeared from the courthouse after his trial. The record shows that Mary's statements to Mrs. Merriman were made with the knowledge and consent of Stumpf, who, by reasonable inference, was with his wife when she made them. Stumpf was not only with his wife from the time of Merriman's murder until their arrest in Pennsylvania, he also initially adopted her story of Merriman's disappearance.
Stumpf also challenges the admissibility of Mary's statements to Rod Nidiffer that Merriman was in jail and had given her money for rent. The only reasonable inference that can be drawn from the evidence, since Stumpf was present with Mary at the Nidiffers' home at the time of her challenged statement, is that Mary's statements were made not only with Stumpf's knowledge and consent, but also at his direction. Moreover, Stumpf himself also told the Nidiffers that Merriman was in jail.
Stumpf also challenges the admissibility of references to his wife's admissions, which were contained in the transcript of his confession. The doctrine of adoptive admissions, as recognized and approved in Coppola and Shiflett, applies to these statements as well. The transcript of Stumpf's voluntary confession reflects that he was the first one to make any reference to Mary's prior statements and that his initial version of events contained many statements that she allegedly had made to him. His references to those statements were obviously necessary to give content to his story, and clearly indicated that he did not consider those communications to be of a private or privileged nature. Therefore, Mary Stumpf's statements were admissible as admissions adopted by
Stumpf.
(4) Stumpf also raises the issue whether the trial court erred by denying him a jury instruction regarding double jeopardy. Multiple convictions in a single trial for murder committed during the commission of robbery and the underlying offense of robbery do not violate the double jeopardy guarantee. See Spain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va. App. 385, 373 S.E.2d 728 1988).
For the reasons stated, the conviction is affirmed.
Affirmed.
Disposition
Affirmed.
|