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Jones v. State5/6/2003
aboratory for making such analysis. Thirdly, he contends that the confirmation report from MPL, which confirmed Cooper's findings, was hearsay and violated his right of confrontation under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Finally, he contends that the urine sample existed as a result of a physician-patient relationship because it was taken as part of his care as a patient and not at the direction of Sergeant McFadden as directed and authorized by Mississippi Code Annotated § 63-11-19 (Supp. 2001). Since he never waived the physician-patient privilege, Jones asserts that any analysis and testimony about the analysis should not have been allowed.
. The State contends that the statute in question is superseded by the Mississippi Rules of Evidence and that the rules are the paramount authority guiding the trial judge's decision on admissibility of evidence. The State does not address the merits of Jones's hearsay argument concerning the confirmation report nor his argument regarding the violation of the physician-patient privilege, arguing instead that these issues are procedurally barred.
. We will discuss first Jones's last argument regarding the non-waiver of the physician-patient privilege because if we rule that the physician-patient privilege precludes use of Jones's urine specimen, the State's case unravels at the seams. However, we begin by reciting our standard of review of a trial judge's decision to admit or deny evidence. That standard is an abuse of discretion standard. Johnston v. State, 567 So. 2d 237, 238 (Miss. 1990).
A. Physician-Patient Privilege
. "Admission of evidence is within the discretion of the trial judge. That discretion must be exercised within the scope of the Mississippi Rules of Evidence, and reversal will only be had when an abuse of discretion results in prejudice to the accused." Parker v. State, 606 So. 2d 1132, 1137-38 (Miss. 1992).
. The physician-patient privilege exists as a result of statutory enactment and court promulgated rules. State v. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle, 726 So. 2d 554 ( , 11) (Miss. 1998); Miss. Code Ann. § 13-1-21(1) (Supp. 2001); M.R.E. 503(b). Our supreme court has previously announced quite clearly that the physician-patient privilege applies with equal force in criminal proceedings as it does in civil cases. Cotton v. State, 675 So. 2d 308, 312 (Miss. 1996).
. However, the physician-patient privilege is not an impenetrable fortress and contains a number of statutory exceptions. In Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle (BMH-GT), the State, as a part of a criminal investigation of a homicide, issued a subpoena duces tecum and search warrant to BMH-GT for medical records of patients who were admitted or treated at BMH-GT for cuts and lacerations inflicted on any part of the patient's body from July 8-9, 1996. BMH-GT, citing Mississippi Code Annotated § 13-1-21, refused to honor the subpoena duces tecum. The trial court, relying upon the statutory physician-patient privilege, as well as the one created by the rules of evidence, quashed both the search warrant and the subpoena duces tecum. Baptist Memorial Hospital-Golden Triangle, 726 So. 2d at 556 ( ).
. On appeal, the Mississippi Supreme Court reversed the trial court. In reaching its decision, the supreme court found some support in the fact that Mississippi Code Annotated § 45-9-31 requires medical personnel to report to law enforcement personnel information regarding persons who have been treated for injuries caused by gunshot or knifing. The court gave the following reasons for its decision:
The public interest in effective and efficient investigations into
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