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City of Norfolk v. Ingram4/22/1988
risdiction has considered this issue in an analogous factual situation. In Allstate Insurance Co. v. Sullivan, 643 S.W.2d 21 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982), the court held that a lessee's operation of a rental car while intoxicated, in violation of a specific prohibition in a rental agreement, did not avoid omnibus coverage. Although the decision relied in part upon the fact that the lessee had paid for coverage and on the Missouri court's liberal construction of its omnibus statute, the court pointed out that if an omnibus provision could be limited by forbidding the user to drive while intoxicated, the same rationale would authorize an exclusion of omnibus coverage if the vehicle were operated negligently or in violation of statute. Id. at 23.
Our omnibus statute, Code § 38.2-2204(A) (formerly Code § 38.2-381), requires that insurance coverage extend to anyone " using... the motor vehicle... with the express or implied consent of the named insured against liability [for claims arising] as a result of negligence in the operation and use of such vehicle." (Emphasis added.) The statute is to be liberally construed to effectuate insurance coverage to permissive users. Storm v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 199 Va. 130, 135, 97 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1957).
Nowhere in the statute do we find any authority to restrict the manner of operation. If we were to hold that omnibus coverage to operate a motor vehicle could be conditioned upon a restriction against driving it while intoxicated, there is no rational reason why such coverage could not be limited by the owner's prohibition of the user's operation of the loaned vehicle in violation of law, thus incorporating any traffic violation listed in chapter 4 of Code Title 46.1. Such a rule would essentially undercut the legislative policies of protecting a permissive user against liability to others and creating a means of recovery to any party injured when struck by a vehicle operated by a permissive user. See Czoka, 200 Va. at 390, 105 S.E.2d at 873. We do not believe the legislature intended such a result.
Finding no merit in the City's position that its permission to operate the car has been violated and that the violation negated the omnibus insurance coverage, we will affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Disposition
Affirmed.
COMPTON, J., dissenting.
There is no dispute in the evidence that Ingram had been ordered by his superiors not to drive the city vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants. Yet, despite the command of that order, of which Ingram had full knowledge, he intentionally (not negligently or accidentally) proceeded to consume a large quantity of liquor and become thoroughly intoxicated. Then, he drove the vehicle while inebriated causing a head-on collision.
In my opinion, Ingram's permission to use the vehicle ended when he became intoxicated. See Fidelity, etc., Co. v. Harlow, 191 Va. 64, 59 S.E.2d 872 (1950). He was obligated by the terms of the permission to park the vehicle and not to drive it until he was sober.
Thus, I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and enter final judgment for the city.
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