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Kaeo v. Davis5/14/1986
off the road while attempting to round a curve. See supra note
2. And there was more from which a jury could infer "four beers," though insufficient to cause Davis to be intoxicated in a strict penal sense, were "sufficient to impair his capacity to perceive the dangers with the clarity, make the decisions with the prudence, and operate the vehicle with the skill and caution required by law." Simon v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 412, 419-20, 258 S.E.2d 567, 572-73 (1979). Unquestionably, the evidence of drinking was relevant and material.
B.
The evidence, however, was also deemed inadmissible on the ground
that "in today's society, any indication of drinking, no matter what the amount, and driving can raise undue prejudice against that person who has been said to be 'drinking and driving.'" See supra note 2. "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice . . . ." Haw. R. Evid. 403. Unfair prejudice "means an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one." Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rules of Evidence (Fed. R. Evid.) 403. "The responsibility for maintaining the delicate balance between probative value and prejudicial effect," we have said, "lies largely within the discretion of the trial court." State v. Iaukea, 56 Haw. 343, 349, 537 P.2d 724, 729 (1975) (citation omitted). "Nevertheless, discretion can be abused," E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 185, at 547 (3d. ed. 1984), and in this instance we think it was.
Relevant evidence, as noted above, is not excludable under Haw. R. Evid 403 unless its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. "Analyzing and weighing the pertinent costs and benefits is no trivial task . . . . Even the same item of evidence may fare differently from one case to the next, depending on the relationship to the other evidence in the cases and the importance of the issues on which it bears." Id., at 546 (footnote omitted). A ruling of inadmissibility premised merely upon an impression that "any indication of drinking" by a party is fraught with "the danger of unfair prejudice" cannot be one that "satisf the cost-benefit calculus" demanded by Haw. R. Evid. 403. Id. at 548.
Granted, the evidence of drinking was prejudicial. Still, evidence with a capacity for unfair prejudice cannot be equated with testimony simply adverse to the opposing party; for evidence is only material if it is prejudicial in some relevant respect. 1 J. Weinstein and M. Berger, Evidence P 403 (1985) (citation omitted). We are not willing to assume "any indication of drinking" is so unfair to the drinking driver that the opposing party must be denied his right to have relevant and
material evidence considered by the trier of fact. Nor are we willing to concede that trial juries, with guidance from the trial court, are incapable of rendering objective fact determinations in trials of negligence actions in which drinking is involved.
The judge's ruling of inadmissibility, it appears, was influenced by representations that in pre-trial depositions Miss Kido and Samuel Taupo testified Davis was sober prior to the accident and the investigating officer detected none of the tell-tale signs of drunkenness when he questioned Davis at the accident scene. These, however, were matters that could have been offered instead for a
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