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Kaeo v. Davis5/14/1986
ld inject the feeling of partisanship in their minds, and limit the deliberations to the specific questions submitted.'" Seppi v. Betty, 99 Idaho at 191, 579 P.2d
at 688-89 (quoting McCourtie v. United States Steel Corp., 253 Minn. 501, 518, 93 N.W.2d 552, 563 (1958)); see also G. Nordbye, Use of Special Verdicts Under Rules of Civil Procedure, 2 F.R.D. 138, 139 (1941). Yet some courts and commentators are skeptical that "special verdicts really [have done] much to eliminate the effects of bias, sympathy and prejudice from jury deliberations and jury verdicts." Id. at 192, 579 P.2d at 689. Experience has taught them that "jurors are concerned about the effect of their verdicts on the ultimate outcome of the case and the use of a special verdict or special interrogatories does not magically eliminate that well known trait of American juries." Id. Furthermore, the Supreme Court of Idaho for one is convinced "the tendency of juries to adjust their verdicts to accord with their notions of the justice of the cause is an inherent characteristic of juries and will be with us as long as [there are juries;]" id., and so are we.
We are convinced too that "in most cases the jury will in fact know which party is favored by a particular answer." C. Wright and A. Miller, supra, § 2509, at 512. A juror in all likelihood would deduce from what happens at trial "that it will be in the plaintiff's interest for him to answer 'No' to the question contributory negligence[,]" id. at 512-13, or that it may be in the plaintiff's interest to answer "yes" to the question on the negligence of a putative joint tortfeasor. "Thus an attempt to keep the jury in the dark as to the [legal] effect of its answers is likely to be unavailing . . . ." Id. at 513.
Given these probabilities, we cannot discount "the danger that [jurors] will guess wrong about the law, and may shape [their] answers to the special verdicts, contrary to [their] actual beliefs, in a mistaken attempt to ensure the result [they] deem desirable." Id. Nor can we dismiss the possibility that some jurors with incomplete knowledge of the law will exert undue influence in the deliberations. In either event, it would be "'better for courts to be the vehicle by which the operation of the law is explained.'" H. Woods, Comparative Fault § 18:2, at 367 (1978) (quoting Simpson v. Anderson, 33 Colo. App. 134, 517 P.2d 416 (1973)).
We believe the trial court, if requested and when appropriate, should inform the jury of the possible legal consequence of a verdict apportioning negligence among joint tortfeasors. An explanation of the operation of the doctrine of joint and several liability in that situation would be consistent with our directive in HRCP 49(a) that " he court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter . . .
submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue."
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
Disposition
The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for a new trial.
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