 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
BROYLES v. STATE4/29/1985
Tried without a jury, Broyles was convicted of DWI and other offenses. Aside from the punishment imposed, the court assessed costs of $302.25, which apparently included the "additional" costs of $250 mandated by Act 918 of 1989. Ark. Stat. Ann. 75-2531 (Supp. 1989). The appeal comes to this court under Rule 29(1)(c).
The first of two arguments for reversal is that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Broyles was intoxicated within the statutory definition. 75-2502(a) (Supp. 1983). In a criminal case the standard for review is not whether the evidence eliminates a reasonable doubt but simply whether the finding of fact is supported by substantial evidence. Gardner v. State, 263 Ark. 739, 746, 569 S.W.2d 74 (1978), cert. denied 440 U.S. 911 (1979).
Officer McCain, who first stopped Broyles, testified that Broyles had weaved into the oncoming traffic lane several times and smelled of liquor when stopped. Broyles successfully fled in his car for a few minutes, but the officer who quickly found and arrested Broyles testified that he was stumbling and staggering, he smelled strongly of intoxicants, his eyes were bloodshot, and he had trouble walking. Broyles refused to take a breathalyzer test, though he did remark at the time: "Drunker than hell." He testified that he is an alcoholic but had not had even beer that day. He said that for a severe migraine headache he had taken medicine that was labeled 43% alcohol and also contained codeine. Even though he admitted having drunk the whole bottle instead of taking it by the tablespoonful, he said that would
have nothing to do with his driving. Upon the conflicting proof there was obviously substantial evidence to support the trial court's finding that Broyles was driving while intoxicated.
Second, it is argued that the statutory imposition of $250 in additional costs, especially the $75 of that amount that goes to the city or county, is not directly related to the cost of prosecution and must be regarded as a mandatory imposition of punishment rather than as an assessment of costs.
The statute provides that a person convicted of DWI shall pay, "as an additional cost," the sum of $250. 75-2531. Of that amount $75 goes to the city or county of the court levying the additional cost. Half the remainder goes to support the Highway Safety Program. That program was established by the Omnibus DWI Act and has five enumerated objectives, every one of which relates to drunken driving. 75-2514 (Supp. 1983). The other half of the remainder goes to the Alcohol and Drug Safety Fund and is to be used to support detoxification services and alcohol and drug abuse rehabilitation and treatment services. 75-2531.
The decisions elsewhere are not unanimous in deciding to what extent the costs in a criminal case must be directly related to that particular prosecution. An Oklahoma court required a direct relationship between the expense of prosecution and the fixing of costs. Ex Parte Coffelt, 99 Okl. Cr. 349, 228 P.2d 199 (1951). Other courts take a less restrictive approach. In Virginia the court sustained the levy of a fixed amount after every conviction for a traffic offense, to help support the Division of Motor Vehicles in its central record keeping and reporting. Carter v. City of Norfolk, 206 Va. 872, 147 S.E.2d 199 (1966). It was said: "The costs collected under Code 14.1-200.1 therefore reimburse the State for expenses incurred by it as a result of prosecutions for traffic offenses." Quite similar to the case at bar was a Florida decision upholding a statute levying a fixed amount as costs in every case not of a civil nature, to be used for the support of the bureau of law enforcement. State v. Y
Page 1 2 3 Arkansas DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|