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Heninger v. Charnes6/30/1980
The Department of Revenue (Department) revoked the driver's license of Dexter E. Heninger (Appellant), and the order of revocation was affirmed by the district court in a proceeding for judicial review under section 24-4-106, C.R.S. 1973. This appeal raises constitutional issues relating to the license-revocation provisions of sections 42-2-122(1)(i) and 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973. We affirm the judgment of the district court.
The facts are not in dispute. Prior to the revocation of his driver's license, the appellant had accumulated an extensive record of alcohol-related traffic offenses. He was convicted of driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor in 1970. On September 2, 1975, he sustained a conviction for driving on March 13, 1975, while his ability was impaired. On March 11, 1976, he sustained another conviction for driving under the influence on October 3, 1975. Thereafter, on June 8, 1977, he was again convicted for driving on January 2, 1976, while under the influence. After having been duly served with notice, appellant appeared with counsel at a hearing before the Department on September 3, 1977, and admitted the prior convictions. Two orders of revocation were entered by the Department. The first order revoked the appellant's operator's license for a period of at least two years based on his three prior convictions for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence. Section 42-2-122(1)(i), C.R.S. 1973. The second order of revocation was for a period of at least five years
and was based on the appellant's three convictions of driving while under the influence or while impaired within a seven-year period. Section 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973. Appellant claims that the mandatory revocation provisions of sections 42-2-122 (1)(i) and 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, violate equal protection of the laws, due process of law, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment under the United States and Colorado Constitutions.
I. EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS
The appellant raises several claims with respect to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article II, Section 25 of the Colorado Constitution. Initially, he claims that the revocation procedures authorized by sections 42-2-122(1)(i) and 42-2-203, C.R.S. 1973, for alcohol-related driving offenses implicate fundamental rights -- the right to drive an automobile and the right to travel interstate. Appellant contends that since a fundamental right is affected by the statutory revocation procedures, the proper standard for equal protection analysis is that of strict judicial scrutiny. Under this standard the state has the burden of establishing that the statutory revocation scheme is necessarily related to a compelling governmental interest. E.g., San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 29 L.Ed.2d 534 (1971); Bernzen v. Boulder, 186 Colo. 81, 525 P.2d 416 (1974); Jarmel v. Putnam, 179 Colo. 215, 499 P.2d 603 (1972). Appellant maintains that the statutory scheme cannot satisfy this stringent constitutional standard. Alternatively, appellant argues that even if a fundamental right is not involved, the statutory revocation procedures, by discriminating against alcoholics and problem drinkers, fail to satisfy
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