 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Reed v. Maryland9/6/1978
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms . . . ." The expert proponents of admission were Dr. Tosi and Dr. Henry Truby. Dr. Louis J. Gerstman was the opponent. The court held:
" I find that voice identification by aural comparison and spectrographic analysis has probative value; that the technique of spectrographic analysis has been accepted by a substantial section of the scientific community concerned; that the government's proposed expert in this field, Mr. Frederick Lundgren, is qualified; and that the jury will not be misled by such evidence. I have therefore ruled that evidence of spectrographic voice analysis and identification will be admitted in this case." Id. at 273.
Neither Alea, 265 So. 2d 96, nor Worley, 263 So. 2d 613, relied upon Frye. I find of interest the concurring opinion of Judge Mager in Worley, where he said:
"I fail to discern a distinctive difference between the analysis and identification of a voice by an expert based solely upon the scientific reproduction thereof (i.e. voiceprints) and the identification of a voice by a lay witness based merely upon hearing the voice.
Simon v. State, Fla.App.1968, 209 So.2d 682. It would seem that in each instance the question becomes one more properly relating to the weight or value to be given to such identification or testimony by the trier of fact. Clearly the victim of a threat or an obscene call is permitted to testify as to the identification of such voice by comparison with that of the alleged perpetrator. See Cason v. State, supra; Weinshenker v. State, supra; and Simon v. State, supra. See also annotation in 24 A.L.R.3d 1261." Id. at 615 (emphasis in original).
The Massachusetts court in Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, rested its decision squarely on the Frye standard, stating:
"Limited in number though the experts may be, the requirement of the Frye rule of general acceptability is satisfied, in our opinion, if the principle is generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use." Id. at 203, 327 N.E.2d at 677.
The court emphasized the language used in People v. Williams, 164 Cal. App.2d Supp. 858, 861-62, 331 P. 2d 251 (1958), saying, "It has been generally accepted by those who would be expected to be familiar with its use," to which the California court added, "In this age of specialization more should not be required." 367 Mass. at 203. The court in Lykus noted a suggestion "that the requirement of general acceptance, as in . . . Frye and [Commonwealth v.] Fatalo [, 346 Mass. 266, 191 N.E.2d 479 (1963)] . . ., should be modified or abandoned." The Frye standard was adopted in Massachusetts in Fatalo. The court then said:
"See McCormick, Evidence § 203, p. 491 (2d ed. 1972), where it is said, '"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are
other reasons for exclusion.' The suggestions by this author and others (see the concurring opinion of Mager, J., in the Worley case, supra, 263 So.2d 613, 615 ) urge that the opinions of a qualified expert should be received and that the considerations similar to those expressed in the Frye and Fatalo cases should be for the fact finder as to weight and value of the opinions.
"There is no need for modification of the general principle of the Frye or Fatalo cases in order to uphold the judge's ruling in this case. Examination of (1) the evidence as to admissibility presented before the judge, (2) judicial opinions from othe
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Maryland DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|