 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Reed v. Maryland9/6/1978
l devices. In these circumstances, the apparent objectivity of the machine may suggest a degree of certainty inconsistent with the subjective aspects of the enterprise. United States v. Addison, supra, 498 F. 2d at 744; {PA}
Page 386} People v. Kelly, supra. As the Supreme Court of California stated in Kelly (549 P. 2d at 1245):
". . . Frye was deliberately intended to interpose a substantial obstacle to the unrestrained admission of evidence based upon new scientific principles. . . . Several reasons founded in logic and common sense support a posture of judicial caution in this area. Lay jurors tend to give considerable weight to 'scientific' evidence when presented by 'experts' with impressive credentials. We have acknowledged the existence of a '. . . misleading aura of certainty which often envelops a new scientific process, obscuring its currently experimental nature.' (Huntingdon v. Crowley, supra, 64 Cal.2d at p. 656, 51 Cal.Rptr. at p. 262, 414 P.2d at p. 390; . . . .) As stated in Addison, supra, in the course of rejecting the admissibility of voiceprint testimony, 'scientific proof may in some instances assume a posture of mystic infallibility in the eyes of a jury . . . .' (United States v. Addison, supra, 498 F. 2d at p. 744.)"
In addition to the advantage of substituting scientific for lay judgment as to scientific reliability, the court in United States v. Addison, supra, 498 F. 2d at 744, pointed out that the Frye test
". . . protects prosecution and defense alike by assuring that a minimal reserve of experts exists who can critically examine the validity of a scientific determination in a particular case. . . . he ability to produce rebuttal experts, equally conversant with the mechanics and methods of a particular technique, may prove to be essential."
The dissenting opinion, however, suggests that instead we adopt the rule enunciated by McCormick, that " ny relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless there are other reasons for exclusion." McCormick on Evidence § 203 at 491 (2d ed. 1972). McCormick, in opposition to the great weight of judicial
authority, believes that disagreement in the scientific community regarding the reliability of a scientific process should go to the weight rather than the admissibility of scientific evidence.
This view seems to us unacceptable. It fails to recognize that laymen should not on a case by case basis resolve a dispute in the scientific community concerning the validity of a new scientific technique. When the positions of the contending factions are fixed in the scientific community, it is evident that controversies will be resolved only by further scientific analysis, studies and experiments. Juries and judges, however, cannot experiment. If a judge or jurors have no foundation, either in their experience or in the accepted principles of scientists, on which they might base an informed judgment, they will be left to follow their fancy. Thus, courts should be properly reluctant to resolve the disputes of science. "It is not for the law to experiment but for science to do so," State v. Cary, supra, 99 N.J. Super. at 332.
Nonetheless, under the McCormick standard, juries would be compelled to make determinations regarding the validity of experimental or novel scientific techniques. As a result, one jury might decide that a particular scientific process is reliable, while another jury might find that the identical process is not. However, the reliability of the underlying technique or process to perform as it is supposed to does not vary with different cases. Using the polygraph as an example, although pa
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 Maryland DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|