State v. Torres6/10/2003
1215, 1217 (Ct. App. 1975). If it is not expressly included as an element, "we presume an intent requirement." State v. Powell, 115 N.M. 188, 190, 848 P.2d 1115, 1117 (Ct. App. 1993). However, the legislative intent may indicate that a violator is guilty even without a criminal intent as to each of the elements of the crime. See State v. Harrison, 115 N.M. 73, 77, 846 P.2d 1082, 1086 (Ct. App. 1992). In such strict liability crimes, the legislature intends to prohibit certain acts, even though they may be performed without criminal intent, because "the public interest is so compelling, or the potential harm so great, that the public interest must override the individual's interests." Id. For example, our courts have found such a public interest in the statute prohibiting driving while intoxicated. Id.; see also State v. Johnson, 2001-NMSC-001, 6, 17, 130 N.M. 6, 15 P.3d 1233.
This Court has previously addressed the intent requirement of Section 30-7-3 in Powell, 115 N.M. at 191, 848 P.2d at 1118. In Powell, we noted that the intent to possess a firearm requires only the knowledge that the "object possessed is a firearm." Id. The issue was whether an "evil intent" on the part of the person possessing the firearm was required to convict a defendant under Section 30-7-3. In concluding that it was not required, we used reasoning consistent with the basis for a strict liability crime, observing that the danger of possessing a firearm in a liquor establishment was not connected to an evil intent of the possessor, but instead was intended as a protective measure. Powell, 115 N.M. at 191, 848 P.2d at 1118.
In this case, Defendant's proposed defense was that he had an honest and reasonable belief in a mistaken fact -- that the restaurant was not a liquor establishment. He is correct that such a defense is generally applicable when the State must prove criminal intent. However, Section 30-7-3 requires general criminal intent as to carrying of the firearm but not as to the premises upon which the firearm is carried.
To convict under Section 30-7-3, the jury must find that the establishment is licensed to dispense alcoholic beverages and that the defendant was carrying a firearm in the establishment. See UJI 14-702 NMRA 2003. The general criminal intent instruction of UJI 14-141 NMRA 2003 imposes the requirement that the jury find that the defendant acted intentionally by purposely doing the criminal act even though the defendant may not know that the act is unlawful. See State v. Barber, 91 N.M. 764, 767, 581 P.2d 27, 30 (Ct. App. 1978) (recognizing, in a strict liability case, that " he doing of the act is what is prohibited"). Defendant does not contest that he purposely carried the gun into the restaurant which had a liquor license. Section 30-7-3 does not require more.
The purpose of Section 30-7-3 is to protect the innocent patrons of an establishment serving alcoholic beverages. State v. Soto, 95 N.M. 81, 82, 619 P.2d 185, 186 (1980). The legislature has exercised this prerogative under its police power because of the obvious danger in the combination of firearms and liquor consumption. See State v. Lake, 121 N.M. 794, 796-97, 918 P.2d 380, 382-83 (Ct. App. 1996); Powell, 115 N.M. at 191, 848 P.2d at 1118; State v. Dees, 100 N.M. 252, 255, 669 P.2d 261, 264 (Ct. App. 1983). The potential for danger exists regardless of whether the person possessing the firearm in a liquor establishment is drinking. To avoid this potential for danger, the statute intends that a person possessing a firearm refrain from entering a liquor establishment. It places the burden upon such person to ascertain whether he or she is entering an establishment with a liquor license. See, e.g., Mo
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