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State v. Werner6/5/2003
tness. There is no question that the standard used by this Court in reviewing a trial justice's ruling to admit or exclude such evidence is one of abuse of discretion. In construing Rule 609 of the Rhode Island Rules of Evidence, the trial justice has broad discretion. State v. Maxie, 554 A.2d 1028, 1032 (R.I. 1989). We also have held that the trial justice has an obligation to weigh the potential for prejudice against the probative value of such evidence on the issue of credibility. Simpson, 606 A.2d at 680. We also have held that weighing the element of remoteness in time in respect to determining prejudice lies within the discretion of the trial justice. State v. Camirand, 572 A.2d 290, 295 (R.I. 1990). Indeed Rule 609(b) provides in part as follows: "Discretion. Evidence of a conviction under this rule is not admissible if the court determines that its prejudicial effect substantially outweighs the probative value of the conviction." The rule also notes that if the conviction is for a misdemeanor not involving dishonesty or false statement, the evidence may be challenged. Id. Such evidence also may be challenged for remoteness in time. Id.
There is no question that this Court has upheld the rulings of trial justices allowing evidence of prior convictions to be introduced using the abuse of discretion standard. The standard of abuse of discretion is one that gives extreme deference to the trial justice's determination. Upholding a trial court's discretionary ruling does not imply that the appellate court necessarily would have ruled in the same manner as the original determination. In the case at bar, the trial justice may well not have committed an abuse of discretion if he admitted the challenged convictions. By the same token, we conclude in this case that considering the nature of the convictions and the dates of the convictions in relation to the time of the trial, we cannot say that the trial justice committed an abuse of discretion in ruling as he did for the reasons advanced in support of said ruling. Therefore, we hold that the trial justice did not commit an abuse of discretion or reversible error in granting the state's motion in limine to exclude the evidence of prior convictions in respect to witnesses Stoddard and Gammon.
VI. Jury Instruction on Witness Identification
The defendant contends that the trial justice committed reversible error in that portion of his instructions to the jury relating to eyewitness identification. The challenged portion follows:
"You may take into account both the strength of the identification and the circumstances under which the identification was made which includes whatever condition you may find that the witness was in when he viewed the defendant. You may also take into account that an identification made by picking the defendant out of a group of similar individuals is generally more reliable than one which results from the presentation of the defendant alone to a witness. You may also take into account any occasion in which a witness failed to make an identification." (Emphasis added.)
The defendant contends that the trial justice's allusion to the comparison between the selection of a photograph from an array of individuals in comparison to the selection of a single individual constituted an unfair comment upon the evidence. We agree with defendant that the trial justice is obliged to be scrupulously fair to the defendant and to the state and that the justice "must not infringe upon the factfinding province of the jury by coercion or improper suggestion." State v. Souza, 425 A.2d 893, 900 (R.I. 1981). We also agree that " t is not the function of a trial justice to act as [a trial] advocate for either t
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