 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Foster6/12/2003
ere not met in the instant case, the written consistent statement was inadmissible hearsay, and the trial court erred in allowing the statement. Id. This error served only to improperly bolster Michelle's testimony. See Tome v. United States, 513 U.S. 150, 157-58 (1995) (discussing federal Rule 801(d)(1)(B) and stating that the purpose of the rule is to rebut an alleged fabrication or motive, not to "bolster the veracity of the story told.").
We reject the State's contention that Foster "opened the door" to the prior consistent statement. The State asserts that because Foster asked Michelle a single, non-substantive question about her prior consistent statement, and then questioned Michelle's veracity by asking about her prior inconsistent statements, the State was allowed to admit the statement in its entirety as substantive evidence. However, this so-called "fairness" argument amounts to an argument that may have been proper under pre-SCRE law, but is simply not tenable under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). See Saltz, supra (evidence of a prior consistent statement is only permitted when Rule 801(d)(1)(B) is satisfied); Fulton, supra (same).
Furthermore, the instant case is distinguishable from other cases where we have found that defense counsel contributed to the error by opening the door to otherwise arguably impermissible evidence. See, e.g., State v. Robinson, 305 S.C. 469, 409 S.E.2d 404 (1991); State v. Stroman, 281 S.C. 508, 316 S.E.2d 395 (1984); State v. Sullivan, 277 S.C. 35, 282 S.E.2d 838 (1981). " hen a party introduces evidence about a particular matter, the other party is entitled to explain it or rebut it, even if the latter evidence would have been incompetent or irrelevant had it been offered initially." State v. Beam, 336 S.C. 45, 52, 518 S.E.2d 297, 301 (Ct. App. 1999); see also State v. Dunlap, Op. No. 25616 (S.C. Sup. Ct. filed Apr. 7, 2003) (Shearouse Adv. Sh. No. 12 at 35) (finding that evidence of prior drug convictions was properly allowed to rebut false impression made by counsel in opening statement). However, counsel here merely asked whether Michelle had given police a statement consistent with her testimony on direct examination. Allowing the State to then admit the written statement did not rebut or explain this testimony in any way. Instead, the sole purpose the State had for admitting Michelle's prior consistent statement was to rehabilitate its witness and bolster her credibility which was called into question by the cross-examination on her prior inconsistent statements. This is forbidden unless the requirements of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) are met.
Accordingly, we find the Court of Appeals' correctly held the trial court erred by admitting the prior consistent statement, and thus abused its discretion. Saltz, supra; McDonald, supra.
The State argues that any error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was merely cumulative. We disagree.
As we stated in Saltz: " rroneously admitted corroboration testimony is not harmless merely because it is cumulative. On the contrary, 'it is precisely this cumulative effect which enhances the devastating impact of improper corroboration.'" Saltz, 346 S.C. at 124, 551 S.E.2d at 246 (citation omitted).
In its harmless error analysis, the Court of Appeals stated the following:
[Michelle's] credibility was of paramount importance; her testimony that Foster shot her mother at point blank range after he "snatched" the gun away was the crucial evidence offered by the State of an intentional shootingà. Moreover, far from being overwhelming, the evidence of guilt was highly equivocal.
We agree with the Court of Appeals. In its opening statement, the State
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 South Carolina DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|