State v. Lafond4/3/2003
P.2d 1127, 1131 (Utah 1994) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. IV). The parties agree that "stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a 'seizure' within the meaning of [the Fourth] Amendment , even the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention quite brief." Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979). Accord State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 659 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (" here is no question that [defendant] was seized by [the officer's] traffic stop."). However, "'what the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, but unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1873 (1968) (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222, 80 S. Ct. 1437, 1446 (1960)). Accord State v. Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 450 (Utah 1996).
" n determining whether the seizure and search were 'unreasonable,'" we ask, first, "whether the officer's action was justified at its inception" and, second, "whether it was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." Terry, 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879. Accord State v. O'Brien, 959 P.2d 647, 649 (Utah Ct. App. 1998). Lafond does not argue that Officer Salis's stop of her vehicle--ostensibly for speeding and an unlighted license plate--was unjustified. See, e.g., Patefield, 927 P.2d at 657 (holding that officer's stop for "having a burned-out license plate bulb" was "justified at its inception" under Terry); State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 917 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ("A police officer may legally stop a vehicle incident to a traffic offense."). Therefore, we consider only the second prong of Terry--whether Officer Salis's questioning and subsequent search of Lafond unconstitutionally exceeded the scope of the original stop.
I. The Questioning
Lafond argues that given the purpose of the traffic stop, Officer Salis had no basis for asking extraneous questions, including questions about weapons and illegal drugs. Indeed, the law is well settled that " nce a traffic stop is made, the detention 'must be temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop.'" State v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983)). Furthermore, " he scope of the search must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1878 (1968) (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310, 87 S. Ct. 1642, 1652 (1967) (Fortas, J., concurring)). Accord State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991).
This means that
an officer conducting a routine traffic stop may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct a computer check, and issue a citation. However, once the driver has produced a valid driver's license and evidence of entitlement to use the vehicle, "he must be allowed to proceed on his way, without being subjected to further delay by police for additional questioning."
Investigative questioning that further detains the driver must be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity. Reasonable suspicion means suspicion based on specific, articulable facts drawn from the totality of the circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop.
Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132 (quoting State v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)) (other citations omitted).
Moreover, even if "reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity does arise, the scope of the stop is still limited. The officers must '"diligently [pursue] a mean
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