State v. Lafond4/3/2003
s of investigation that likely to confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it necessary to detain the defendant."'" Id. (quoting State v. Grovier, 808 P.2d 133, 136 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686, 105 S. Ct. 1568, 1575 (1985))) (alterations in original).
After Officer Salis asked the driver for his license, vehicle registration, and proof of insurance, his suspicions were aroused by the following facts: (1) the driver admitted that his license was previously suspended for a DUI; (2) the driver was holding a large refill cup; (3) there was a purple Crown Royal bag on the front seat that appeared to have something in it; (4)when asked to locate the vehicle registration, Lafond looked on the front seat and floorboard, retrieved a small leather coin purse and placed it on the seat between her legs; and (5) there was a cup holder on the console containing small green particles that looked like marijuana.
We think that these circumstances, taken together, constitute "specific, articulable facts" sufficient to warrant "reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal activity," id., specifically, on-the-road consumption of alcohol and marijuana. In light of this reasonable suspicion, Officer Salis was justified in asking Lafond whether there was anything illegal in the vehicle, whether there was any alcohol or marijuana in the vehicle, and whether anyone had smoked marijuana in the vehicle lately. These questions, in and of themselves, were closely tied to Officer Salis's observations and suspicions and did not unconstitutionally prolong Lafond's detention. See State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1137 (Utah 1989) ("An investigative detention is justified if a police officer has a reasonable and articulable suspicion that the automobile's occupants are 'involved in criminal activity.'") (quoting United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 226, 105 S. Ct. 675, 679 (1985)). We therefore turn our attention to whether the subsequent frisk and search of Lafond were constitutionally justified.
II. The Search
Lafond argues that Officer Salis searched her without probable cause or exigent circumstances. In the alternative, Lafond contends that even if Officer Salis's conduct amounted only to a Terry frisk, the frisk was nevertheless conducted without reasonable suspicion that she was armed and dangerous.
We first determine whether Officer Salis was constitutionally justified in frisking Lafond. The legality of a frisk for weapons, absent probable cause, is governed by Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 (1968), and its progeny.
In Terry, the Supreme Court established a narrowly drawn exception to the Fourth Amendment requirement that police obtain a warrant for all searches. Where a police officer validly stops an individual for investigatory or other purposes and reasonably believes that the individual may be armed and dangerous, the officer may conduct a "frisk" or "pat-down" search of the individual to discover weapons that might be used against him.
State v. Carter, 707 P.2d 656, 659 (Utah 1985). While it is not necessary that an officer "actually have been in fear," id., the officer "must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion." Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. Accord Carter, 707 P.2d at 659 ("A mere unparticularized suspicion or hunch is not sufficient.").
This court recently explained that " wo basic scenarios may warrant a Terry frisk." State v. Warren, 2001 UT App 346, , 37 P.3d 270, cert. granted, 2002 Utah LEXIS 152.
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