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Stivers v. State9/25/2003
Harold Stivers appeals his conviction for failing to stop after an accident, a violation of Ark. Code Ann. § 27-53-101 (Supp. 2001). On appeal, Stivers argues that the trial court erred in refusing to give the jury his proffered instruction, and that the court improperly commented on his right not to testify. Stivers's first point has no merit, and his second point is not preserved for our review; accordingly, we affirm.
On August 21, 2001, Stivers was involved in an automobile accident in which he ran his pickup truck into the back of Jessica Price's car on Cantrell Road in Little Rock; Price was injured in the wreck. Stivers was intoxicated at the time of the accident. Several eye-witnesses were able to give the police the license plate number off of Stivers's truck, and they identified Stivers after the police found him and returned him to the accident scene. Stivers was subsequently charged with leaving the scene of an accident, driving under the influence , and other offenses.
As noted above, Stivers was convicted of violating § 27-53-101. That statute is contained in Title 27 of the Arkansas Code, "Transportation," and is captioned under "Accidents." Section § 27-53-101 sets out the "requirements in accidents involving death or personal injuries," and provides in relevant part as follows:
(a)(1) The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident resulting in injury to or death of any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at the scene of the accident, or as close thereto as possible, but shall then immediately return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of [Ark. Code Ann.] § 27-53-103 [(Supp. 2003)].
At the conclusion of his jury trial, Stivers proffered a jury instruction based on his own interpretation of § 27-53-101, arguing that due process required the State to prove that he knew Price had been injured and that he purposely left the scene knowing that she had been injured. His proffered instruction would have required the State to prove the following elements:
First: That Harold Stivers was the driver of a vehicle involved in a motor vehicle accident with Jessica Price;
Second: That Jessica Price suffered physical injuries as a result of this motor vehicle accident;
Third: That Harold Stivers knew that Jessica Price suffered physical injuries as a result of this motor vehicle accident;
Fourth: That Harold Stivers purposely failed to stop his vehicle at the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible; or did not immediately return to the scene of the accident and remain there until he had given his name, address, and registration number of the vehicle he was driving.
(Emphasis added.) The trial court refused this instruction, finding that it did not accurately state the law, as § 27-53-101 does not contain an element regarding Stivers's knowledge of Price's injuries.
On appeal, Stivers argues the trial court was statutorily required to accept his proffered jury instruction and "graft" a mens rea requirement onto § 27-53-101. To consider Stivers's argument, we must engage in statutory construction in order to determine whether there is - or should be - an element of intent in § 27-53-101. This court reviews questions of statutory interpretation de novo because it is our responsibility to determine what a statute means. Buckley v. State, 349 Ark. 53, 76 S.W.3d 825 (2002); R.N. v. J.M., 347 Ark. 203, 61 S.W.3d 149 (2001). We construe criminal statutes strictly, resolving any doubts in favor of the defendant. Short v. State, 349 Ark. 492, 79 S.W.3d 313 (2002); Hagar v. State, 341 Ark. 633 19 S.W
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