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State v. Pierre8/29/2003
ibility because it makes a distinction between the two tests in numerous places throughout the statute, evincing that urine tests are not merely subsets of "chemical tests." For example, the statute states: The refusal to submit to a chemical or physical breath test or to a urine test . . . is admissible into evidence . . . ." § 316.1932(1)(a)1., Fla. Stat. (2002). (emphasis added). If urine tests were intended to fall within the definition of chemical tests, the emphasized language would be superfluous. See Pinellas County v. Woolley, 189 So. 2d 217 (Fla. 2d DCA 1966) (words in statute not to be construed as superfluous if reasonable construction exists that gives effect to all words). We conclude, therefore, that no ambiguity exists by the failure to define "chemical tests."
The second possible ambiguity is illustrated by Appellee's purported quote to section 316.1932 (1) (a) 1., contained within his brief, which states: "approved . . . urine test for the purpose of detecting the presence of chemical substances. . . ." Appellee suggests by this quote that the adjective "approved" is intended to modify "urine test," despite the fact that the three dots represent the omission of over thirty words and three commas that separate the word "approved" from the words "urine test." To accept Appellee's strained construction we would have to ignore the statute's plain language and improperly attribute to the legislature a gross grammatical faux pas. See State v. Dugan, 685 So. 2d 1210 (Fla.1996) (meaning of statute determined from plain meaning of words used). Moreover, to construe the statute in this manner would require that we ignore the remainder of the statute, which, taken in its entirety, clearly conveys a contrary intent. See St. Mary's Hospital v. Phillipe, 769 So. 2d 961 (Fla. 2000) (statute must be construed in its entirety and as a whole). Nowhere else within the statute is any reference made to the "approval" of urine tests. Further, the specific grant of authority given to the FDLE to implement rules for blood and breath testing is devoid of any reference to urine testing. § 316.1932 (1) (a) 2., Fla. Stat. (2002). Unlike blood and breath testing, where the legislature's only mention of procedures is the grant of authority to FDLE to implement them, the procedures for urine testing are specifically set forth in the statute:
The urine test shall be administered at a detention facility or any other facility, mobile or otherwise, which is equipped to administer such tests in a reasonable manner that will ensure the accuracy of the specimen and maintain the privacy of the individual involved.
§ 316.1932 (1) (a) 1., Fla. Stat. (2002). Taken as a whole, therefore, the statute evinces an unambiguous intent that urine tests need not be approved. The legislature apparently concluded that its own basic guidelines were sufficient for this rather simple test, but that more comprehensive procedures should be developed for blood testing, which is more intrusive, and breath testing, which is more complex, than urine testing. We conclude, therefore, that no ambiguity exists and that principles of construction need not be utilized. State v. Bradford, 787 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 2001).
REVERSED and REMANDED, conflict CERTIFIED.
SHARP, W., and GRIFFIN, JJ., concur.
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