 |
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Veikoso8/11/2003
* FOR PUBLICATION *
Defendant-appellant Amanaki L. Veikoso (Appellant) appeals from the May 29, 2002 judgment of conviction and sentence of the Circuit Court for the First Circuit, the Honorable Michael A. Town presiding, adjudging him guilty of habitually driving under the influence (DUI) of intoxicating liquor, in violation of Hawaii Revised Statutes (HRS) § 291-4.4 (Supp. 2000) [hereinafter, the habitual DUI charge]. On appeal, Appellant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the habitual DUI charge after he had offered evidence in support of his allegation that the predicate DUI convictions were constitutionally invalid. The prosecution, relying on the judgment of this court announced in State v. Shimabukuro, 100 Hawaii 324, 60 P.3d 274 (2002), concedes that dismissal of the habitual DUI charge was appropriate. Pursuant to State v. Hoang, 93 Hawaii 333, 336, 3 P.3d 499, 502 (prosecution's confession of error not binding on an appellate court), cert. denied, 94 Hawaii 329, 12 P.3d 854 (2000), and based on our independent examination of the record, we hold that dismissal is not warranted and affirm Appellant's conviction.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 10, 2000, Appellant was charged with habitual DUI. HRS § 291-4.4 provided in relevant part that:
(a) A person commits the offense of [habitual DUI] . . . if, during a ten-year period the person has been convicted three or more times for a offense; and
(1) The person operates or assumes actual physical control of the operation of any vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor[.]
Id. In order to meet its burden of proof, the prosecution relied on, inter alia, four prior DUI convictions entered against Appellant within the relevant time period.
On April 10, 2001, Appellant filed a "Motion to Strike Prior Convictions for Sentencing Purposes and Dismiss Count I [the habitual DUI charge]" [hereinafter, motion to dismiss]. Appellant's purpose in filing the motion to dismiss was to collaterally attack the validity of three of his underlying DUI convictions and preclude the prosecution from using them to prove the habitual DUI charge.
Following a hearing on the matter, the trial court found that three of Appellant's prior DUI convictions were obtained in violation of Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 11 and constitutional standards intended to ensure that a guilty plea is knowing and voluntary. The trial court, however, denied the motion to dismiss after determining that the continued validity of the predicate prior convictions was irrelevant to establish culpability for the habitual DUI charge.
On November 26, 2001, Appellant entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the trial court's denial of his motion to dismiss. On May 29, 2002, Appellant was sentenced to five years of probation with, inter alia, the following conditions: (1) six months of imprisonment as to Count I; (2) thirty days of imprisonment as to Count II, to be served concurrently; and (3) payment of a $100 Crime Victim Compensation fee. On June 26, 2002, Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
A. Conclusions of Law
A trial court's conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. State v. Poohina, 97 Hawaii 505, 508, 40 P.3d 907, 910 (2002). "Under this standard, [the appellate court] examine the facts and answer the question without being required to give any weight to the trial court's answer to it. Thus, a conclusion of law is not binding upon the appellate court and is freely reviewable for its correctness." Id. (quoting Chun v. Board of Trustees of E
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Hawaii DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
|
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|