State v. Bohannon8/21/2003
n best comports with simplicity, fairness, and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. The majority's approach of requiring a separate written judgment to be filed is contrary to an in pari materia reading of the relevant rules, the import of past precedent, and reason. The course chosen by the majority will cause an increased burden upon the district courts, counsel, the Intermediate Court of Appeals, and this court. In light of past practice, it is likely that nearly every district court case in which a final order is appealed from will have to be remanded for entry of a judgment in the form of a separate document, causing substantial delay and expense. Moreover, because the majority approach allows the filing of a separate judgment to be done at any time, it permits manipulation of the appeals process by one party to the substantial detriment of the opposing party and is thus inimical to the fair administration of the rules.
Applying an in pari materia approach, I would hold that the appeal of Plaintiff-Appellant State of Hawaii (the prosecution) from the January 31, 2001 order of the district court of the first circuit (the court) granting the motion to suppress evidence filed by Defendant-Appellee Alicia Anne Bohannon (Defendant), and its January 22, 2001 order denying reconsideration was untimely because the time for appeal ran from May 26, 2000, the date the court's order was entered on the court's calendar, and not from the date of a separate written order filed with the clerk some eight months later. Justice Ramil, who retired on December 30, 2002 and had heard oral argument in this case, had joined in this position.
I.
Prior to trial in this case, Defendant moved to suppress all evidence obtained after the unlawful stop of her car. The court found that the prosecution failed to meet its burden of bringing the seizure of Defendant within a recognized exception to the warrant requirement. On May 26, 2000, the court granted Defendant's motion to suppress and dismissed the case by decision and oral order. The court clerk made a notation of the decision on the court calendar on the same day. There were no rules applicable to criminal cases in the district court that required the court to make findings of fact or conclusions of law at the time and no findings or conclusions of law are in the record on appeal.
The prosecution did not appeal from the May 26, 2000 notated order but, instead, moved for reconsideration of the court's order on June 13, 2000. In its motion for reconsideration, the prosecution, for the first time, argued that the arresting officer's actions in this case fit within the "public safety" exception to the warrant requirement and advocated adoption of this exception.
The court orally denied the motion for reconsideration on July 17, 2000, and the clerk entered the order on the court calendar. A written order denying the motion for reconsideration was later filed on December 11, 2000 and signed on January 22, 2001 (the January 22, 2001 order). The written order granting the motion to suppress was filed on January 25, 2001 and signed on January 31, 2001 (the January 31, 2001 order), after the order denying reconsideration. On February 15, 2001, the prosecution appealed.
On appeal, Defendant contends, inter alia, that the prosecution's appeal was untimely because the prosecution was required to appeal within thirty days of the clerk's notation on the court's calendar on May 26, 2000, pursuant to HRPP Rule 32(c)(2) (2000). Defendant maintains that, inasmuch as the prosecution did not appeal until February 15, 2001, eight months and ten days later, its appeal was late.
On the other hand, the prose
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