State v. Bohannon8/21/2003
cution argues that its notice of appeal was timely filed on February 15, 2001. According to the prosecution, the filing with the court clerk of the January 22, 2001 written order denying the motion for reconsideration and the January 31, 2001 written order granting the motion to suppress "constituted 'entry' of the orders for purposes of [HRAP Rule 4(b)(1)][.]" As such, the prosecution asserts that its February 15, 2001 notice of appeal, "filed within 30 days after entry of the above orders, was timely."
II.
It is well established that the interpretation of rules promulgated by the supreme court involves principles of statutory construction. See State v. Lei, 95 Hawaii 278, 281, 21 P.3d 880, 884 (2001); State v. Lau, 78 Hawaii 54, 58, 890 P.2d 291, 295 (1995); Keaulii v. Simpson, 74 Haw. 417, 421, 847 P.2d 663, 666, reconsideration denied, 74 Haw. 650, 853 P.2d 542, cert. denied, 510 U.S. 814 (1993). "The interpretation of a statute is a question of law which this court reviews de novo." Konno v. County of Hawaii, 85 Hawaii 61, 71, 937 P.2d 397, 407 (1997) (quoting State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawaii 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (1995) (citation omitted)). Therefore, the interpretation of HRPP Rule 32 (2000) and HRAP Rule 4 is a question of law reviewable de novo.
III.
HRPP Rule 32(c) directs that, in the district court, judgments of conviction are deemed entered by the notation of the judgment on the court calendar. In relevant part, Rule 32(c)(2) provides that
judgment of conviction in the district court shall set forth the disposition of the proceedings and the same shall be entered on the record of the court. The notation of the judgment by the clerk on the calendar constitutes the entry of the judgment.
(Emphases added.) As stated, supra, principles of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of court rules. The language of HRPP Rule 32(c)(2) is "plain and unambiguous." Applying its "plain and obvious meaning[,]" Rule 32(c)(2) applies only to judgments of conviction. See Konno, 85 Hawaii at 71, 937 P.2d at 407 (" here the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous, our only duty is to give effect to its plain and obvious meaning." (Citations omitted.)). Here, Defendant was not convicted, and, thus, no judgment of conviction was entered. Therefore, HRPP Rule 32(c)(2) does not apply to the case at bar.
IV.
On the other hand, HRAP Rules 2.1(a), 4(b)(1), 4(b)(3), and HRPP Rule 2 are relevant to this case and rules upon the same subject matter should be construed with reference to each other. Cf. HRS 1-16 (1993) ("Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called in aid to explain what is doubtful in another."); Canalez v. Bob's Appliance Serv. Ctr., Inc., 89 Hawaii 292, 306, 972 P.2d 295, 310 (1999) (taking an in pari materia reading of HRS § 607-9 and Hawaii Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 68).
A.
As previously indicated, HRAP Rule 4(b)(1) provides that a notice of appeal in criminal cases must be filed within thirty days of the order appealed from. See supra note 4. HRAP Rule 4(b)(3) explains that an order is deemed entered when it is filed with the clerk. "A judgment or order is entered within the meaning of [HRAP Rule 4(b)(1)] when it is filed with the clerk of the court." HRAP Rule 4(b)(3). HRAP Rule 2.1(a) (2001) incorporates other court rules into the HRAP, including the HRPP. HRPP Rule 2 sets forth the purposes and principles for construction of the HRPP.
These rules are intended to provide for the just determination of every penal proceeding. They shall be co
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