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State v. Bohannon8/21/2003
nstrued to secure simplicity in procedure, fairness in administration and the elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay.
HRPP Rule 2 (2000) (emphases added). Insofar as the HRPP may be treated as part of the HRAP "whenever applicable," it is reasonable to consider the purposes set forth in HRPP Rule 2 in construing the HRAP as it relates to criminal case appeals from the district court. In that light, the prosecution's urging that an order appealed from is deemed "entered" for purposes of HRAP Rule 4(b)(1) when a separate order is filed with the district court conflicts with the purposes stated in HRPP Rule 2.
The clerk entered the court's decision and order on the court calendar on May 26, 2000. The making of such a notation plainly "secure simplicity in procedure[.]" HRPP Rule 2 (emphasis added); see generally HRPP Rule 50 ("The district and circuit courts may provide for placing criminal proceedings upon appropriate calendars."); cf. State v. Nishi, 9 Haw. App. 516, 526, 852 P.2d 476, 481 (1993) (" district court judgment consists of the clerk's notation on the court's daily calendar containing numerous cases." (Citing HRPP Rule 32(c)(2).)).
Employing this notation procedure also avoids unjustifiable expense and delay because it promotes efficiency in the district court, where the caseload is a heavy one. See State v. Graybeard, 93 Hawaii 513, 517, 6 P.3d 385, 389 (App. 2000) (stating that " he simple expedien permitted by HRPP Rule 32(c)(2) [in the district court] subserves . . . the goal of efficiency in a court that carries a multitude of cases").
Finally, the notation procedure which establishes a firm date from which to measure appeal time as of the rendering of the court's order promotes fairness in the administration of the rules. By contrast, the majority's approach allows for manipulation of the date of filing an appeal without any timely connection to the court's actual decision. Under the majority's holding, a party would be able to suspend the filing of an appeal, irrespective of when the district court rendered its decision, as long as it appealed within thirty days of the date the separate order was eventually filed.
As mentioned, the court, by decision and order of May 26, 2000, suppressed the evidence obtained in the search and dismissed the case against Defendant. The prosecution did not appeal the May 26, 2000 oral order, but instead moved for reconsideration. On July 17, 2000, the court denied the prosecution's motion for reconsideration. Five months later, on December 11, 2000, the prosecution filed a document it had prepared entitled "Order Denying Motion to Reconsider Order Granting Motion to Suppress Evidence." Eight months after the May 25, 2000 Order, on January 25, 2001, the prosecution filed another document entitled "Order Granting Motion to Suppress Items of Evidence." Finally, nearly nine months after the court rendered its decision by order of May 26, 2000, on February 15, 2001, the prosecution appealed from the January 31, 2001 order.
B.
The notation procedure satisfies HRAP Rule 4(a)(3) since the entry of the order is tantamount to a filing of the order. Like the filing of a separate document with the clerk, a notation by the clerk establishes a record of the decision. Because the notation of an order by the court clerk constitutes the entry thereof, it is functionally equivalent to filing a separate document with the clerk, as envisioned in HRAP Rule 4(b)(3). Cf. Child Support Enforcement Agency v. Roe, 96 Hawaii 1, 15, 25 P.3d 60, 74 (2001) (holding that the unequivocal notification by a court to a party of a discovery requirement that the court expects that party to obey, under app
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