State v. Bohannon8/21/2003
able de novo." State v. Arceo, 84 Hawaii 1, 10, 928 P.2d 843, 852 (1996) (quoting State v. Camara, 81 Hawaii 324, 329, 916 P.2d 1225, 1230 (1996) (citations omitted)). See also State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawaii 8, 18, 904 P.2d 893, 903 (1995); State v. Higa, 79 Hawaii 1, 3, 897 P.2d 928, 930 (1995); State v. Nakata, 76 Hawaii 360, 365, 878 P.2d 699, 704 (1994). . .
Gray v. Administrative Director of the Court, 84 Hawaii 138, 144, 931 P.2d 580, 586 (1997) (some brackets added and some in original). See also State v. Soto, 84 Hawaii 229, 236, 933 P.2d 66, 73 (1997). Furthermore, our statutory construction is guided by established rules:
When construing a statute, our foremost obligation is to ascertain and give effect to the intention of the legislature, which is to be obtained primarily from the language contained in the statute itself. And we must read statutory language in the context of the entire statute and construe it in a manner consistent with its purpose.
When there is doubt, doubleness of meaning, or indistinctiveness or uncertainty of an expression used in a statute, an ambiguity exists. . . .
In construing an ambiguous statute, " he meaning of the ambiguous words may be sought by examining the context, with which the ambiguous words, phrases, and sentences may be compared, in order to ascertain their true meaning." HRS § 1-15(1) [(1993)]. Moreover, the courts may resort to extrinsic aids in determining legislative intent. One avenue is the use of legislative history as an interpretive tool.
Gray, 84 Hawaii at 148, 931 P.2d at 590 (quoting State v. Toyomura, 80 Hawaii 8, 18-19, 904 P.2d 893, 903-04 (1995)) (brackets and ellipsis points in original) (footnote omitted). This court may also consider " he reason and spirit of the law, and the cause which induced the legislature to enact it . . . to discover its true meaning." HRS § 1-15(2)(1993). "Laws in pari materia, or upon the same subject matter, shall be construed with reference to each other. What is clear in one statute may be called upon in aid to explain what is doubtful in another." HRS § 1-16 (1993).
State v. Rauch, 94 Hawaii 315, 322-23, 13 P.3d 324, 331-32 (2000) (quoting State v. Kotis, 91 Hawaii 319, 327, 984 P.2d 78, 86 (1999) (quoting State v. Dudoit, 90 Hawaii 262, 266, 978 P.2d 700, 704 (1999) (quoting State v. Stocker, 90 Hawaii 85, 90-91, 976 P.2d 399, 404-05 (1999) (quoting Ho v. Leftwich, 88 Hawaii 251, 256-57, 965 P.2d 793, 798-99 (1998) (quoting Korean Buddhist Dae Won Sa Temple v. Sullivan, 87 Hawaii 217, 229-30, 953 P.2d 1315, 1327-28 (1998)))))).
III. DISCUSSION
A. This Court Has Appellate Jurisdiction To Address The Merits Of The Prosecution's Appeal.
As a threshold matter, Bohannon asserts that this court lacks jurisdiction to consider the prosecution's appeal. Relying on Hawaii Rules of Penal Procedure (HRPP) Rule 32(c)(2) (1999), Bohannon contends that the prosecution failed to file its notice of appeal within thirty days from the clerk's notation in the traffic calender of the district court's oral orders (1) granting Bohannon's motion to suppress and (2) granting Bohannon's oral motion to dismiss. Bohannon argues that the May 26, 2000 notation constituted the order from which the prosecution should have appealed, pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(b)(1), and, therefore, that the prosecution's notice of appeal, filed on February 15, 2001, was untimely and mandates that this court dismiss the present appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
Bohannon further asserts that, because the prosecution's notice of appeal did not expressly refer to the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration, the notice of
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