State v. Bohannon8/21/2003
appeal "is expressly limited to the order granting the motion to suppress." Bohannon maintains, assuming arguendo that the prosecution impliedly incorporated the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration into its notice of appeal, the notice of appeal was nevertheless untimely pursuant to HRPP Rule 44(b)(1), which was in effect at the time the clerk noted the disposition of the foregoing motion in the traffic calendar.
The prosecution responds that the district court's oral statement granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss, noted in the traffic calendar by the clerk on May 26, 2000, did not constitute an appealable order, pursuant to HRAP Rule 4(b)(1). Rather, the prosecution maintains that the written order granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss, filed-stamped by the district court clerk on January 25, 2001 and signed by Judge Devens on January 31, 2001, constituted the "entry" of the orders within the meaning of HRAP Rule 4(b)(1) and for purposes of appeal and, thus, that the prosecution's notice of appeal, filed on February 15, 2001, was timely. Moreover, the prosecution argues that, inasmuch as there was no "judgment of conviction" in the present matter, HRPP Rule 32(c)(2) is inapplicable to the present appeal altogether.
Finally, with respect to Bohannon's contention that the district court's order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration was outside the scope of its notice of appeal, the prosecution asserts (1) that "the very subject matter of the motion to reconsider was the propriety of the court's . . . order granting the motion to suppress" and (2) that the prosecution's "right to appeal from the order granting [Bohannon's] motion to suppress under HRS [§] 641-13(7) . . . encompasses a right to appeal from the . . . order denying motion to reconsider [the district court's] order granting the motion to suppress." We agree with the prosecution.
"A court always has jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction over a particular case." State v. Brandimart, 68 Haw. 495, 496, 720 P.2d 1009, 1010 (1986); State v. Graybeard, 93 Hawaii 513, 516, 6 P.3d 385, 388 (App. 2000) ("An appellate court has . . . an independent obligation to ensure jurisdiction over each case and to dismiss the appeal sua sponte if a jurisdictional defect exists."). Moreover, "compliance with the requirement of the timely filing of a notice of appeal[, as set forth in HRAP Rule 4(b)(1),] is jurisdictional." Id. at 497, 720 P.2d at 1010; Graybeard, 93 Hawaii at 516, 6 P.3d at 388 ("An appellant's failure to file a timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional defect which cannot be waived by the parties or disregarded by the court in the exercise of its discretion.").
For purposes of the present matter, we address the following two questions: (1) whether HRPP Rule 32(c)(2), see supra note 9, HRPP Rule 44(b)(1), see supra note 9, or HRAP Rule 4(b)(1), see supra note 1, triggered the time period within which the prosecution was required to file its notice of appeal and (2) whether the time for the prosecution's filing of its notice of appeal began to run on (a) May 26, 2000, being the date on which the district court clerk noted on the traffic calendar the district court's oral statement granting Bohannon's motions, (b) July 17, 2000, being the date on which the district court clerk noted on the traffic calendar the district court's oral statement denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, (c) January 22, 2001, being the date on which the district court signed its written order denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration, or (d) January 31, 2001, being the date on which the district court signed its written or
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