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State v. Bohannon8/21/2003 der granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss.
1. HRAP Rule 4(b) Governs The Timing Requirement For Appeals In All Criminal Cases.
We note at the outset that HRPP Rule 32(c)(2), see supra note 9, by its plain language, is inapplicable to the present matter. The rule expressly provides in relevant part that " he notation of the judgment by the clerk on the calendar constitutes the entry of the judgment." (Emphasis added.) Inasmuch as Bohannon's case never proceeded to a judgment of conviction, the district court having granted Bohannon's motion to suppress and thereafter having granted her oral motion to dismiss the case against her, there was simply no judgment of conviction from which the prosecution could have filed a notice of appeal. Accordingly, the May 26, 2000 notation of the district court's oral statement granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss by the clerk on the traffic calendar is irrelevant to the disposition of the present matter. The applicability of HRPP Rule 44(b)(1), however, requires a preliminary determination as to whether the prosecution's notice of appeal subsumed the district court's oral order denying its motion for reconsideration, noted by the clerk in the traffic calendar on July 17, 2000.
A notice of appeal must be both sufficient in form and timely. See City and County of Honolulu v. Midkiff, 57 Haw. 273, 275-76, 554 P.2d 233, 235 (1976). With respect to the first mandate, this court has consistently recognized that "the requirement that the notice of appeal designate the judgment or part thereof appealed from is not jurisdictional." Id. at 275, 554 P.2d at 235 (citations omitted). Further to the foregoing,
a mistake in designating the judgment, or in designating the part appealed from if only a part is designated, should not result in loss of the appeal as long as the intent to appeal from a specific judgment can be fairly inferred from the notice and the appellee is not misled by the mistake.
Id. at 275-76, 554 P.2d at 235 (quoting 9 Moore's Federal Practice 203.18 (1975)) (emphases added).
In the present matter, the prosecution's notice of appeal did not expressly refer to the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration, instead stating only that "the State intends to contest the propriety of the Order Granting Motion to Suppress Items of Evidence . . . ." We believe, however, that the prosecution's intent to appeal from the district court's order denying its motion for reconsideration can be reasonably inferred from its notice of appeal, inasmuch as the district court's order denying the motion for reconsideration was merely an extension of its order granting Bohannon's motions to suppress and to dismiss. Bohannon has asserted no persuasive argument that the failure expressly to include the district court's order denying the motion for reconsideration in the prosecution's notice of appeal was "misleading . . . to detriment." Midkiff, 57 Haw. at 276, 554 P.2d at 235. That being the case, we hold that the prosecution's notice of appeal "is sufficient in form," id., for purposes of an appeal from the district court's written order denying its motion for reconsideration, signed by the district court on January 22, 2001.
With respect to the timeliness of the prosecution's notice of appeal, we must first resolve the apparent conflict between HRPP Rule 44(b)(1) and HRAP Rule 4(b). HRAP Rule (4)(b), which governs the time for filing appeals in criminal cases, provides in relevant part that " judgment or order is entered within the meaning of this subsection when it is filed with the clerk of the court." See supra note 1. Moreover, HRAP Rule 4(b) -- which
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